



FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

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**THE IDEOLOGY OF HELLENOTURKISM:
FROM GEORGE OF TREBIZOND TO DIMITRI KITSIKIS**

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The Ideology of Hellenoturkism:
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Trabzonlu Georgios' dan Dimitri Kitsikis'e
Hellenotürkizm ideolojisi

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- 5) Ecumenical Empire

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To Dimitri,

For our common Dream for the peoples of Turkey and Greece

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When I first visited Turkey back in 2009, my luggages were overload with mixed feelings; according to my prior education, I was about to encounter the “hereditary enemy” of my nation. Indeed, solidified views in both Greece and Turkey -but also within the international community- hold that the two countries form by definition an oppositional pair and a classic exemplar of ferocious hostility and perpetual contention, which reflect an assumed traditional rivalry between the two peoples that spans almost one millennium.

There are certain interwoven reasons that created and consolidated such stereotypes, leading to a celebrated negative motif of Turkish-Greek relations. The most substantial among them are the international and national historiographies and politics. As regards the former, the epistemic hegemony of the West, on the one hand, together with the epistemic nationalisms in the Greek and Turkish academies, on the other, generated for decades a bulk of historical works that spawned a monotonous reconstruction of the Turkish- Greek past. The majority of the Greek, Turkish and foreign scholars made selective usage of the past, directed not to what actually happened, but to how the past could be rebuilt as a projection of the present and become a powerful arsenal in the fight with the Other. The recurrent tensions between the two states were rebounded upon the respective historiographies, imposing biased interpretations of earlier realities. Such conscious (or subconscious) anachronistic historiographical approaches have often obscured the positive aspects of the shared pre-modern experience of the two peoples and downplayed the mutual indebtedness. They dominated and quietened alternative memories and accounts for years, while, at the national level, they accommodated the encirclement of nationalist suspicion mind-sets and the excessive stressing of internal and external enemies.

Having fallen victim to externally imposed narratives and diametrically opposed national historiographies –designed to legitimize certain policies- the Turkish and Greek peoples leave with the consequences of this cursory reading of their history to date. In this context, both the constitutive states and the average citizen embarked on a unidirectional quest for data that cement prejudices and feed the rhetoric of professional patriots, who claim the monopoly of knowledge and truth. Moreover, if one combines the official discourses of the two states today he might easily reach the conclusion that we often fight the battles of yesterday, sticking with the frozen narrative of a bygone era that bear little resemblance to today's realities. Such fixations and monolithic approaches have had multiple deleterious effects to the mutual understanding of the two sides. In the political realm, these phenomena have been translated into the strained bilateral relations of Turkey and Greece in the second half of the 20th century.

My short 2009 stay in Turkey made me reconsider and soon I began an inquisitive search for unconventional approaches to the Turkish-Greek affairs. I found that alternate scholarly efforts had only recently started to surface, possibly as the outcome of maturity and the perception of an enhanced security feeling endorsed by the post-1999 détente. Still, these works -albeit positive- were not going too far to challenge the overall historical premise. Hence, when I decided to pursue a Master in International Relations at Istanbul Bilgi University in 2011, I was already determined to dig further. I had in my mind a transcendent proposal for the future geopolitical arrangement of the Aegean space based on a union between Turkey and Greece. My advisor's suggestion for relevant sources consisted of one word: Kitsikis. After delving into his writings, I realised that this suggestion was one of this metamorphic moments that would shape my academic and life course hereinafter.

The purpose of the present paper is merely descriptive, i.e. to provide a synopsis of the history and contours of the hellenoturkic ideology as they were expounded in the works of Dimitri Kitsikis. I plan to furnish a more comprehensive treatise on hellenoturkism -possibly in the form of a doctoral thesis- that will facilitate a pedantic evaluation of its innards and future prospects. The road to Çamlıca *shall* remain open.

Christos Ch. Kypraios

Heidelberg

10 April 2015

*Aramızda bir mavi büyü
bir sıcak deniz
kıyılarında birbirinden güzel
iki milletiz*

*Bizimle dirilecek bir gün
Ege'nin altın çağı
Yanıp yarının ateşinden
Eskinin ocağı*

Mustafa Bülent Ecevit, *Türk-Yunan Şiiri*, 1947*

1. Prologue

Since Greece won its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1829, the century-long aggrandizement of the infant Greek state and the parallel shrinkage of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the fission of the broader space of Southeaster Europe and Near East for the first time in the last three millennia. This geopolitical anomaly -firmly sealed by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923- is still experienced today, having engendered an artificial dipole on the two sides of the Aegean that produces mutually repulsive forces between its two antipodal points, i.e. Greece and Turkey.

In the 1960s the Greek historian Dimitri Kitsikis launched a discourse to alter this perverse reality, proposing the creation of a Turkish-Greek Confederation. This *prima facie* utopian

**A blue magic between us
And this warm sea
And two peoples on its shores
Equals in beauty.*

*The golden age of the Aegean
Will revive through us
As with the fire of the future
The hearth of the past comes alive*

plan, which is in fact a proposition for the restoration of the centuries-long *status quo ante* of the wider Aegean space under a new state structure, draws its theoretical underpinnings from the history and culture of the area which aims to rearrange. Its two mainstays are the theory of “Hellenoturkism” and the geopolitical concept of “Intermediate Region”, according to which the Turks and the Greeks are carriers of a common civilization that prevails between the Eastern Mediterranean and the Indus River.

The present study provides an overview of the historical evolution of the hellenoturkic ideology -as it has been recounted in the works of Dimitri Kitsikis- in a linear chronological order. The method used thereby is a critical reading and reconstruction of various textual sources - personal and official exchanges, parliament debates, interviews to the press, germane writings - purporting to create a narrative unraveling the hellenoturkic tendencies through time. However, as Hellenoturkism and the theory of the Intermediate Region are two closely interrelated parts of a greater holistic syllogism, the study inescapably touches upon the latter in order to facilitate a better understanding of the subject matter.

2. Hellenoturkism

The term “hellenoturkism” was masterminded by Kitsikis in 1966, in order to define two things: i) a civilizational phenomenon, i.e. the co-habitation and interdependence since the 11th century of Hellenism and Turkism, and ii) an ideology grounded on the aforesaid civilizational phenomenon, which aims at the formation a Turkish-Greek political ensemble.¹ That is, “hellenoturkism” was conceived as a dual concept, encompassing an –according to Kitsikis- “fact of civilization” and an ideology based on it with a clear political aspiration. Therefore, in order to examine it, a two-step analysis is required.

¹ Kitsikis (1998), p. 62. *See also* ‘Hellenoturkism’, Wikipedia: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hellenoturkism>.

2.1. Hellenoturkism as a civilizational phenomenon

In his study “Le Nationalisme”, Kitsikis writes: “The social milieu engenders in separate minds the need to give a primordial importance to a reality. If this individual acquires a public that accepts his point of view and wishes to militate for its triumph, an ideology is born. An ideology includes hence three factors: a) a reality; b) the desire to give priority to this reality over all other realities, c) to succeed in convincing a large number of zealots of the necessity of this choice (...) Every ideology is based on a reality”.² Accordingly, “as an ideology, hellenoturkism gives primacy to a (objective) reality, i.e. the Greco-Turkish civilizational phenomenon”.³ So, here we ask ourselves: Is there indeed such a civilizational phenomenon? How does Kitsikis hypostatize it?

2.1.1. The overarching framework: The Intermediate Region and its Ecumenical Empire

At this point, the other seminal theory of Kitsikis comes into play: that of the “Intermediate Region”.⁴ Any appraisal of the Greek-Turkish civilizational phenomenon cannot be undertaken outside the conceptual framework laid by this theory. According to the homonymous geopolitical model that was set forth by Kitsikis in the 1970s, the Eurasian continent is composed of not only two civilisational regions - that is, Western (or Western European) and Eastern (or Far Eastern) - but also a third region found between the two, roughly including Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.⁵ In particular, this “Intermediate Region” stretches from the eastern half of Europe to the western half of Asia, in

² Kitsikis (1971), p. 357. See also Kitsikis (1998), pp. 62-63.

³ Kitsikis (1998), p. 63.

⁴ For a full account, see Kitsikis (2003), pp. 42-52. Also, Davarinos (1995, 1999).

⁵ “Due to historical events spanning thousands of years, the Eurasian continent, of which Europe is but one of its peninsulas, is divided in three civilisational areas: a) the “West” or “Western Europe”, which today includes North America, Australia and New Zealand; b) the “East” or “Far East”, which includes the peninsulas of India, Southeast Asia (with Indonesia) and China (with Korea and Japan); and c) the Intermediate Region, which is found between the East and the West” [Kitsikis (1985), p. 15; Kitsikis (2003), p. 42; Kitsikis (1998), p. 42].

the vast area between the Adriatic Sea and the Indus River.⁶ It comprises a distinct civilization, which is considered as a blend and bridge between the Western and Eastern civilizations,⁷ being inhabited mainly by the Orthodox Slavs, the Arabs, the Persians, the Turco-Mongols, the Greeks and the Jews.⁸ The main scientific input of the “Intermediate Region model” is the rebuttal of the existence of a uniform Europe and a uniform Asia from a civilizational perspective. As the theory holds, the terms “Europe” and “Asia” merely denote geographical regions and not civilisations.

The basic distinguishing element employed by Kitsikis to delineate the three civilizational areas is religion. Given the traditionally paramount role of religions in shaping the cultural identities and idiosyncracies of peoples (despite the relegated status of religion in the increasingly *laïcité* post-Enlightenment western world),⁹ this criterion is scientifically a valid one.¹⁰ Accordingly, the dominant religions in the Intermediate Region are Orthodox

⁶ “The western border of this Intermediate Region extends from north of the Baltic to the middle of the Adriatic, leaving to the West all the Catholic and Protestant countries, i.e. Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Croatia and Italy. The eastern border of the Intermediate Region extends from the Sea of Ochotsk to the Gulf of Aden, leaving to the East the Buddhist Mongolia, China (excluding the Chinese Turkestan) and India (with the part of Pakistan on the east of the Indus River [i.e. today’s Bangladesh]) (...) That is, the Intermediate Region includes the Soviet Union (excluding the Baltic states), the six Balkan states (excluding Croatia), all the Arab countries (from Morocco to the Arabian Peninsula, Ethiopia, Iran and Afghanistan, the “iranian” Pakistan on the west of Indus River (Baluchistan and Pashto) and, finally, the Chinese Turkestan” [Kitsikis (1998), pp. 42-43]. For the map of the Intermediate Region and its western boundary, see Appendices I and II.

⁷ “[Indicatively] we can read the writings of some intellectuals of this region from antiquity onwards, in order to realize to which extent they were feeling as a mixture of the East and the West. Already in the 4th century BC, Aristotle was saying that the Greeks, from their character, are an alloy of Asians and Europeans. In the 7th century, the Qur’an presents Islam as a “interim community” (...) In the 19th century, the Russian intellectuals were saying the same for Russia” [Kitsikis (1998), p. 44].

⁸ Kitsikis (1998), p. 43.

⁹ Kitsikis seems well aware of this fact: “The main components of the collective spirit of a nation are –in addition to the archaic heritage (or hereditary tradition) of which Freud speaks- religion, lifestyle and language. Formerly, religion was the essential differentiating element (...) nowadays, the influence of religion having diminished and communications having drawn communities closer, a common lifestyle is making its way through the vast reaches of our planet. Language is consequently becoming more and more essential differentiating element among nations. Religion will retain its primacy only in such cases as Ireland where the conquering nation almost entirely eradicated the language of the subdued people (...) Language tends today to be the central pillar of national identity” [Kitsikis (1971), p. 353].

¹⁰ Even today, Kitsikis insists that religion is an essential component of international politics and has striven to facilitate the collaboration between the four main religions of Judaism, Christianity, Islam and Hinduism through his active involvement in conferences and other *fora* (e.g. *Dialogue of Civilizations*, Tehran, 1999; *Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi and Intercultural and Civilization Dialogue Proceedings*, Toronto, Canadian Intercultural Dialogue Centre, 2008; *Dialogue of Civilizations Platform*, Gülen Institute, 2008) and his participation in

Christianity and Sunni Islam,¹¹ and to a lesser extent Shiite Islam, Alevism and Judaism.¹² Notwithstanding their theological differences, all these religions display profound interinfluences. Respectively, Catholicism and Protestantism dominate in the West, and Hinduism and Buddhism in the East.¹³ In addition, Kitsikis bases his tripartite classification scheme on several cultural traits –music,¹⁴ architecture,¹⁵ cuisine,¹⁶ folklore, theatre,¹⁷ literature,¹⁸ and philosophy.¹⁹ What distincts the Intermediate Region from the West and the East is the commonalities that are observed in the aforementioned qualities among its various peoples. With specific regard to literature and philosophy, an additional aspect that led Kitsikis to demarcate the borders of his “Intermediate Region” was the consciousness of “the bridge” between the East and the West which was shared by many illustrious thinkers and writers of this median region.²⁰

Furthermore, the cultural cohesion of the Intermediate Region is attested by the fact that, for millenia, each of the main peoples of this area endeavored to unify it under an imperial

dialogues between Orthodox Christians, Sunni Muslims, Iranian Shiites and Indian Hindus. Furthermore, Kitsikis has worked together with Israeli Jews and fundamentalist Catholics in Quebec, where he produced along with his students the quarterly journal *Aquila* that promoted the Byzantine imperial idea amongst catholic circles. See ‘Dimitri Kitsikis’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimitri_Kitsikis.

¹¹ According to Kitsikis, it was the Egyptian-Greek idolatry and the Turkish-Mongolian shamanism that gave way to Orthodox Christianity and Islam respectively [Kitsikis (1998), pp. 43-44]. Moreover, he is aware that the coexistence of Christianity and Islam in the same civilizational area is inconceivable for many people. However, Kitsikis refutes this oxymoron by arguing that there are not substantial differences between Orthodox Christianity and Islam [*Ibid*, pp. 47-50].

¹² Kitsikis (2003), p. 47.

¹³ *Ibid*.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 41.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 100-101; Kitsikis (1998), p. 41.

¹⁶ Kitsikis (2003), pp. 99-100; Kitsikis (1998), p. 41.

¹⁷ Kitsikis (2003), pp. 102-103.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 46-47.

¹⁹ According to Kitsikis, the main common philosophical element among the various peoples of the Intermediate region is the dialectical thinking [See for example Kitsikis (1998), p. 40].

²⁰ Kitsikis (1998), p. 47. Notably, Kitsikis employs an additional cultural criterion to distinguish between “West” and “non-West”; he defines as “West” all the countries where the phenomenon of the Renaissance – that is, the cultural Renaissance of the 15th century, the religious Renaissance of the 16th century, the Enlightenment of the 18th century and the Industrial Revolution of the 18th-20th centuries- was a indigenous product, and as “non-West” the countries where the phenomenon of the Renaissance was imported [*Ibid*].

structure.²¹ Consequently, as regards its political organization the Intermediate Region had been dominated for about 2500 years by an “ecumenical” (or “central”) empire,²² whose centre lay by the Aegean Sea,²³ and particularly the Turkish Straits and Istanbul.²⁴ Fundamentally the same empire throughout history and until 1923, its consecutive leaders sought to unite its different peoples²⁵ until Western intervention -since the 18th century- caused its dismemberment (known as “Balkanisation”) and its subjection to the stranglehold of Westernization.²⁶ This ecumenical empire with the common civilizational characteristics passed successively from the hands of the Persians (Empire of Darius), to Alexander the Great, then to the Hellenistic Romans, the Christian Romans and finally to the Sunni Ottomans until 1923-24, even though the Ottoman Dynasty was originally Alevi.²⁷

²¹ As Kitsikis notes, “a civilizational region tends always to be incorporated in a political ensemble, called empire” [Kitsikis (2003), backcover].

²² “For thousands of years, the peoples grouped around the Eastern Mediterranean have lived within the same civilizational unit. For its inhabitants, this world was in itself self-sufficient, was a universe, an Ecumene. The Ottoman Empire, inheriting the heritage from the Byzantine Empire, was, in its turn, the political expression of this Ecumene” [Kitsikis (1971), p.355]. According to Kitsikis, the ecumenical empire of the Intermediate Region was for 1600 years the “Byzanto-Ottoman Empire”; notably, Kitsikis does not distinguish between the Byzantine and the Ottoman empires, as he considers the Ottoman Empire as the successor of the Byzantine in territorial, political, cultural, economic and social terms [Kitsikis (2003), pp. 50, 72, 88]. At the same period of the Byzantine and Ottoman imperial ecumenicity in the Intermediate Region, the West was dominated by the Holy Western Roman Empire, whereas the Chinese Empire was the ecumenical imperial unit of the East [*Ibid*, p. 50]. During the particular timeframe that the Ottoman Empire was the central empire of its civilizational area, the West was represented by the Habsburg Empire (1273-1918) and the East by the Empire of the Qing and the Manchu (1644-1912) [*Ibid*, p. 26]. For a comparative study of the ecumenical empires of the Intermediate Region and the East in the last 2500 years, see Kitsikis (2007).

²³ On this issue, Kitsikis writes: “The Byzantine Empire, like the Greek Ecumene in the ancient times, was considering the Aegean not as a border, but as a center (...) around which it was developing. Thus, Byzantium had two “lungs”: the Balkan one and the Minor Asian one. It was only natural that the Ottoman Empire that succeeded it was developed in the two shores of the Aegean and the Dardanelles, not as “Europe” and “Asia”, but as Rumeli and Anatolia [Anadolu] (...) the heart of the [Ottoman] empire was beating between the Aegean and the Black Sea, in the interior of a triangle demarcated by three big cities: Thessaloniki, Istanbul and Izmir” [Kitsikis (2003), pp. 80, 35, 89].

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 50. In contrast, Rome was the political center of the West, and the Yellow River valley -and specifically Peijing since the 13th century- that of the East [*Ibid*].

²⁵ Kitsikis (2003), pp. 59, 69. According to Kitsikis, the Ottoman Empire succeeded more than the other empires of the Intermediate Region in that mission, because of its greater territorial expansion that culminated in the 17th century [*Ibid*, p. 69].

²⁶ ‘Intermediate Region’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intermediate_Region.

²⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 62, 139. According to Kitsikis, although the initial Ottoman rulers were Alevi, Orthodox Islam was later chosen as the political religion of the Ottoman state for reasons of political expediency, dictated by the conquest of the Arab territories in 1516-1517 and the consequent influx in the Ottoman Empire of a large Sunni population that was until then a minority within the empire, and the normative simplicity of the Sunni dogmas that made Sunni Islam a preferable option for ruling such an extensive domain. For Mehmed the Conqueror, Selim I and Suleyman the Magnificent, Sunnism was just a political religion that allowed them to extend their rule [Kitsikis (2006), pp. 32-33]. Notably, after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517 Sultan Yavuz Selim

Throughout history, the central empire had been subject to attempts by other empires to seize its political center in order to succeed in its leadership.²⁸ These empires, situated along its periphery, were the Islamic, the Persian and the Russian (until 1917), which strived in different historical junctures to achieve the succession of the ecumenical empire.²⁹

According to Kitsikis, the power dynamic between the central ecumenical empire and the peripheral empires constituted an internal conflict in the Intermediate Region. Each of the main peoples in this area struggled to seize control of its centre of influence, that is, Byzantium-Constantinople-Istanbul, which remained the undisputed focal point for nearly 1600 years.³⁰ The Arabs in the 7th and 8th centuries (with the two sieges of Istanbul by the Umayyads in 674-678 and 717–718) and the Russians in the 20th century (with the the 1915 Constantinople Agreement under which France and Britain promised to give Istanbul and the Dardanelles to Russia in the event of a Triple Entente's victory in the First World War)³¹ almost succeeded in doing so, but eventually failed to occupy the capital of the ecumenical empire. On the other hand, the post-18th century western intervention is considered to be an external conflict, aiming at the obliteration of the ecumenical empire.³²

usurped the title of Caliph from the Arabs, which was since then added to the many titles conferred to the Ottoman sultans. As Kitsikis has rightly argued, though, the usage of that title did not have the religious and political meaning of the original Arab title and, in fact, the legitimacy of the Sultan as Caliph had been steadily contested by the Arabs, whilst it was recognized as valid only by the Turks and the Kurds [Kitsikis (2013), pers. comm, 19 July]. From the 18th century onwards, together with the increasing intervention of the Great Powers and the westernization of the empire, we observe a growing Islamization of the Ottoman state which culminated in the triumph of Pan-Islamism in the final years of the empire during the reign of Abdul Hamid II and the Young Turk regime of Enver Pasha, even though the latter abandoned Pan-Islamism for Pan-Turkism after seeing the non-Turk Muslims of the empire fighting on the side of the British and French during the First World War [Kitsikis (2003), p. 62, 257-258; Kitsikis (2006), p. 32]. *See also infra*, 2.2.5.

²⁸ Kitsikis (2003), p. 51. *See also* 'Intermediate Region', Wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intermediate_Region.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Kitsikis (2003), p. 211.

³¹ Nolan (2002), p. 350.

³² For the distinction between the internal and external conflict in the Intermediate Region, *see* Kitsikis (1998), pp. 52-60; Kitsikis (2003), pp. 51-52. For Kitsikis, the Eastern Question qualifies as an internal conflict of the Intermediate Region (for the succession in its political authority), in which the West intervenes to promote its own interests [*Ibid.*].

Among its different peoples, the Greeks and the Turks played a protagonistic role in the history of the Intermediate Region. This region with its ecumenical empire formed the geographical, cultural and political context within which Hellenism matured and starred for over 2500 years, from the time of the Persians and Alexander the Great until the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the 20th century. In the last thousand years, Turkism grew within the same context.³³ That is, since the 11th century the common civilization of the Intermediate Region bore the characteristics of the Greek and Turkish cultures. The arrival of the Turks in Anatolia (the cradle of Hellenism that soon became a vital part of their own being) in the 11th century³⁴ initiated a thousand-year long period of extensive interaction and cultural fermentation between the two peoples, which was institutionalized and peaked in the Ottoman era. The Greeks and the Turks were not only integrated into the same material lifestyle (i.e. in one common civilization) but even their languages and their religions³⁵ under which the popular beliefs and the way of thinking are shaped bespoke the high level of intermingling between these two cultures.³⁶ In this phase, the ecumenicity of the central empire of the Intermediate Region was expressed as hellenoturkism.³⁷

2.1.2. The Ottoman Empire as a Turkish-Greek “état quasi-coopératif”

Unlike the uncontested and largely self-evident role of the Turkish element in every stage of the Ottoman Empire, the comparably crucial contribution of the Greeks has -often intentionally- glossed over. During the decline of the Byzantine Empire and the parallel rise

³³ What we should stress here is that the Turks were an “indigenous” people of the Intermediate Region, even before they moved towards its center in the 11th century [Kitsikis (2003), p. 69].

³⁴ With the 1071 Battle of Manzikert, where the ancestors of the Ottomans, the Seljuk Turks, defeated the Byzantine army and established themselves in Anatolia [Kitsikis (2003), p. 96].

³⁵ Kitsikis refers indicatively to Frederick Hasluk’s two-volume work *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, where the author demonstrated the deep interaction of the Islamic and Greek Orthodox religions on the popular level [Hasluk (1929, 2006)]. Furthermore, as Kitsikis notes, other authors have shown us that the Greeks and Turks worshiped the same saints, that the Turks agreed to be baptized while remaining Muslims and that they adopted the habit of sacrificing animals, a habit that had its roots in ancient Greece [Kitsikis (1998), p. 42].

³⁶ Kitsikis (2003), p. 273. Several recent studies on the Ottoman socio-cultural history testify the same.

³⁷ ‘Hellenoturkism’, Wikipedia: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hellenoturkism>.

of the Ottomans from the 13th century onwards, the pre-eminent role of Hellenic culture, literature and language became more apparent.³⁸ Already since the 14th century (especially after the ascension of Bayezid I to the throne in 1389) the Ottoman elite, society and administrative structure had become rapidly byzantinized/hellinized.³⁹ At the same period, the majority of the Byzantine society favoured the Turkish expansion at the expense of the Latins, that were infiltrating the collapsing Byzantium.⁴⁰ With the political extinction of the Byzantine Empire and the succession of the Ottomans in the political authority of the ecumenical empire, the Turks and the Greeks immediately acquired primacy within the new imperial unit, with the rest of its peoples coming over time under their absolute dominance.⁴¹

After the conquest of Istanbul in 1453,⁴² Mehmet II set himself to reorganise the state as the conscious heir of the Eastern Roman Empire.⁴³ In order to rule effectively the empire, he classified his subjects (“*râya*”)⁴⁴ in four groups (“*millet*s”),⁴⁵ a (Sunni) Muslim, a Greek, an Armenian and a Jewish.⁴⁶ The first millet that was created was the Greek (*Rûm millet* or

³⁸ Kitsikis (2003), p. 96a.

³⁹ Kitsikis (2003), pp. 81, 88, 98-99, 107-113, 117, 121, 140, 143, 156, 162, 195. “Contrary to Ziya Gökalp’s beliefs, modern research tends to prove that the Ottoman society was keenly byzantine, much more at the popular level than at the level of the ruling class (...) During their process of sedentarization in the 14th century, the Ottomans adopted the customs of the Byzantine royal court and the Byzantine administrative mechanisms, and simply gave them Muslim names” [*Ibid*, p. 107].

⁴⁰ “Gradually, the Turks seized from Venice all its Greek territories (...) thus, the rise of the Ottoman power in the Mediterranean occurred at the expense of the Latin despotism and, from that perspective, was a great blessing for the Greeks” [Lamansky (1968), pp. xiv-xvii, cited in Kitsikis (2003), p. 82].

⁴¹ Kitsikis (2003), p. 28; Kitsikis *et al* (July 1985).

⁴² According to Kitsikis, “Istanbul was not conquered by the Turks but by the Greeks themselves, who replaced the declined Palaiologi dynasty with the flourishing Ottoman one, securing thus an additional period of 400 years of glory to Romiosyne” [Kitsikis (2003), pp. 86-87].

⁴³ Mehmet II –as well as his successors- was using the same titles of the Byzantine rulers, i.e. “King and Emperor of the Romans” (*Kayser-i Rum* or *Sultan-i Rum*), which indicates that he was considering himself as their successor [Kitsikis (2003), p. 89].

⁴⁴ The Rayah formed the tax-paying lower class of the Ottoman society, in contrast to the classes of the Askerî (imperial administrators) and the Kul (slaves of the royal court).

⁴⁵ The initial categorization represented all denominations recognized by the Quran. From the 1860s onwards, under the pressure of the nationalisms that plagued the Ottoman state, the millet system was degenerated, with the Greek millet being compartmentalized into many other Christian millets in order to meet the ethnic divisions of the Ottoman subjects. Around 1875, the millets had increased to nine and continued to rise in number [Kitsikis (2003), pp. 233-234].

⁴⁶ As Kitsikis reminds us, the categorization of the pre-nationalist societies into religious communities was not an Ottoman novelty; since ancient times, every multi-ethnic empire of the Intermediate Region used to grant to its religiously diverse groups an internal autonomy. However, the Ottomans innovated because they standardized and institutionalized this practice [Kitsikis (2003), pp. 63-64]. As regards the millet system itself, Kitsikis has

Millet-i Rûm),⁴⁷ which included all Orthodox Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, Serbs, Vlachs, as well as Arabs and Georgians, despite their differences in ethnicity and language,⁴⁸ and under the Greek domination.⁴⁹ In 1454, the new Emperor ceded important jurisdictions to the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, who at that time represented the religion of the majority in the Empire.⁵⁰ Since then, the two authorities –the Sultan and the Patriarch, as the ethnarch of the Greek Orthodox population- cooperated closely in the management of the Ottoman domains.

Due to this arrangement, the Greek Orthodox Church gained for the first time direct political authority over its ethnically diverse flock,⁵¹ which was progressively increased and which was maintained almost until the fall of the empire. The Ecumenical Patriarch was recognized as the highest religious and political leader of all Orthodox subjects, concentrating in his hands the political power of the Byzantine Emperors.⁵² Although not of an equal status with the

noted: “I consider the 4-millet system established by Mehmet the Conqueror as the basic Constitution of the Ottoman Empire, which in theory gives equality to all of the four millets, even though in time the Rum (“Greek”) millet and the Sunni Muslim (“Turkish”) became more important than the Gregorian Orthodox Armenian millet and the Jewish millet. Each of the four millets were administered by a millet bashi: the Rum Patriarch for the Greek millet, the Seyhulislam for the Turkish millet, the Armenian Patriarch for the Armenian millet, and the Haham bashi for the Jewish millet. In later centuries the Western Embassies in Istanbul imposed on the Empire artificial millets, the Catholic millet (under the control of the Catholic Powers, mainly France) and the Protestant millet (under the control of the Protestant Powers, mainly England), and accordingly succeeded in converting to Catholicism and Protestantism small chunks of the Armenian Orthodox Gregorian millet. You could draw a theoretical ancient temple with four equal in height pillars representing the four millets, sustaining an ancient Hellenistic roof representing the sultan’s power, as supreme arbitrator, above millets or parties. With the Tanzimat, starting in 1838, the millet system was gradually dismantled and replaced with the Western inspired Constitution of 1876, thus marking the demise of the Ottoman constitutional structure” [Kitsikis (2013), pers. comm, 14 July].

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, p. 60. The name was derived from the Byzantine (Roman) subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

⁴⁸ For these ethnicities, the belonging to the Orthodox commonwealth of the Rûm millet became more important than their ethnic origins [Detrez (2008) p. 36]. This Orthodox Christian (Romaic) community became basic form of social organization and source of identity for all the ethnic groups inside it and most people identified themselves simply as *Christians* [Karpát (2002), p. 17; Roudometof (2001), pp. 68–71]. However, ethnonyms did not completely disappeared, which indicates that some form of ethnic identification was preserved. For a more recent study that underlines the role of religious affiliation as the most influential shaper of communal identity in the Ottoman era, see Anscombe (2015). Specifically for the principal role of religion in the formation of the modern Greek and Turkish identities and nationalisms, and the complementary relation between state and religion in Greece and Turkey, see Grigoriadis (2015).

⁴⁹ Kitsikis (2003), pp. 138-139.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p. 64. The Greek Orthodox millet made up the majority until the Ottoman conquest of the Arab territories in 1516-1517, that is for most of the period of the rise of the Ottoman Empire. After that point and until the end of the Ottoman rule, the Orthodox millet was outnumbered by the Muslim one [*Ibid*, p. 139].

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 147.

⁵² *Ibid*, p. 147. Indicatively, the Patriarch adopted the Byzantine imperial symbol, i.e. the double-headed eagle, and the titles of *Αυθέντης* and *Δεσπότης* that were prior reserved for the Byzantine Emperors [*Ibid*].

Muslims, the Greek-Orthodox Christians were granted significant freedoms and extensive internal autonomy.⁵³ The situation remained largely unchanged even after the Ottoman conquest of the Arab lands in the 16th century, when Muslims became the majority of the imperial population.⁵⁴

Furthermore, the vital contribution of the Greeks to the Ottoman edifice is affirmed by their involvement in two institutionalized schemes at the top level: the devshirme system and the reproductive policy of the Ottoman dynasty. The devshirme, which paradoxically has been portrayed in the darkest colours in the Greek historiography and collective consciousness,⁵⁵ was a periodical practice of recruitment for the staffing of the higher Ottoman military and administrative apparatus on which the whole functioning of the empire was based for centuries.⁵⁶ It was consisting in the meritocratic selection of boys and teenagers of Orthodox

⁵³ "Eastern Orthodoxy", *Encyclopedia Britannica online*:

<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/177174/Eastern-Orthodoxy>.

⁵⁴ Kitsikis (1998), p. 46; Kitsikis (2003), p. 98.

⁵⁵ In the Greek educational system, the devshirme (*Παιδομάζωμα*) together with the "Secret school" (*Κρυφό σχολείο*) are two cornerstones in the mythoplacy about the "400-year Turkocracy" (*Τουρκοκρατία*), as the negatively connotated Ottoman period is generally called. The prevalent narrative of the devshirme consist of several canards, pertaining to the frequency and extent of the measure, the forcible nature of the conscription, the age of the selectees and their fate after their selection. First, it is falsely argued that the devshirme was taking place annually, instead of the average of 3-4 and sometimes even 7 years. The conscription was not widespread and was not depriving every Christian Orthodox family of the empire by its male offsprings as believed; instead, the draft was highly selective and, for instance, in the 16th century only 1,000 to 3,000 persons in a population of 22 million were recruited on average every year [See Kitsikis (1998), pp. 126-127]. To support further the «cruelty» of the method, it is commonly stressed that the typical age of the recruits was under 10 years of age, even under 5, contrary to the 8-18 (and mostly 14-18) true spectrum [*Ibid*, p. 126]. The forcibility of the removal of the selectees, as a violent abduction from their families, as well as the penalizing purpose of the policy are two other «undisputed» facts [e.g. see Menage (1966), pp. 64, 70], with the monotonously undeviating narrative holding that the devshirme system was locally resented and resisted, even to the point of Christian parents disfiguring their own sons [Yannaras (2006), p. 112]. As Kitsikis eloquently mentions, the modern Greek depictions -official and popular- of the devshirme typically portray a Greek mother seeing a barbarian Turk taking her boy or even baby away from her arms [Kitsikis (1998), p. 124]. Without denying the partial and occasional hardness of devshirme, such clichés have few to do with the actual practice. As Cleveland notes, the devshirme system offered "limitless opportunities to the young men who became a part of it" [Cleveland (2004), p. 46]; Given that the pool of the recruited was the rural impoverished areas of the empire, the selection of a young man was often welcomed or aspired by his family. Arnold informs us that recruits were sometimes gained through voluntary accessions, as some parents were often eager to have their children enroll in the Janissary service that ensured them a successful career and comfort [Arnold (1896), p. 130]. Also, Malcolm writes that Christian parents in Bosnia were bribing scouts to take their children [Malcolm (1998), p. 46].

⁵⁶ The devshirme was initiated by Murad I, as a means to counteract the growing power of the Turkish nobility «by developing Christian vassal soldiers and converted kapikulları as his personal troops, independent of the regular army» [Shaw (1976), p. 27]. It arose out of the kul system of slavery that developed in the early centuries of the Ottoman Empire. The practice declined in the 16th and 17th century due to a number of factors (including the inclusion of free Muslims in the system) ; After 1568 it was only occasionally taking place and by 1648 it

Christian creed,⁵⁷ mostly from the rural populations of the Balkans but also of Anatolia. The conscriptees were sent to the royal court in Istanbul to receive military and/or educational training,⁵⁸ after having converted to Islam.⁵⁹ The ablest of them were thereupon incorporated in the military or civil service of the empire, either by joining the Janissary corps -that is, Sultan's personal army, a form of "Ottoman praetorians"-⁶⁰ or by pursuing a career within the palace itself. A good number of those men resumed the most senior office of state, that of the Grand Vizier (the Sultan's chief minister and military deputy),⁶¹ took up positions in the Imperial Council (*Divan-ı Hümayun*), and filled key administrative, bureaucratic and religious posts.⁶² Most of the selectees in that "boy harvest" were of Greek, Albanian and Serbian ethnic origin.⁶³ Tens of devshirme of Greek or partly Greek descent became Grand Viziers,⁶⁴ viziers, kadiaskeri, military commanders,⁶⁵ and royal architects or engineers,⁶⁶ especially in

was slowly drawing to an end. An attempt to re-institute it in 1703 was resisted by its Ottoman members who coveted its military and civilian posts. It was finally abolished during Ahmet III's reign (1703–1730) ['Devşirme', Wikipedia: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devşirme>; See also Murphy (2006), pp. 44-46, 223].

⁵⁷ The devşirme were collected with a few exceptions, only from non-Muslims Bosnian Muslims were also recruited and sent directly to serve in the Palace (rather than the military), under groups called "potor" ['Devşirme', Wikipedia: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devşirme>; See also Kitsikis (2003), p. 124].

⁵⁸ Upon reaching adolescence, these selectees were enrolled in one of the four imperial institutions: the Palace, the Scribes, the Religious and the Military. ['Devşirme', Wikipedia: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devşirme>; See also Kitsikis (2003), p. 124].

⁵⁹ Kitsikis claims that the devshirme were in fact becoming Alevi-Bektashi [See for example Kitsikis (2003); Kitsikis (2006)].

⁶⁰ Minorsky (1957), p. 437. "The practice as to Janissary soldiers was motivated by the desire to create an elite class of warriors loyal only to the Sultan, rather than to individual Ottoman nobles (...) Although members of the devshirme class were technically slaves (...) they were of great importance to the Sultan because they owed him their absolute loyalty and became vital to his power. This status enabled some of the 'slaves' to become both powerful and wealthy" ['Devşirme', Wikipedia: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devşirme>].

⁶¹ "The Grand Vizier was the prime minister of the Ottoman sultan, with absolute power of attorney and, in principle, dismissible only by the sultan himself. He held the imperial seal and could convene all other viziers to attend to affairs of the state (...) His offices were located at the Sublime Porte" ['Grand Vizier', Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Vizier].

⁶² Shaw (1976), pp. 132-139.

⁶³ "According to the Encyclopedia Britannica and the Encyclopedia of Islam, in the early days of the empire all Christians were enrolled indiscriminately. Later, those from Albania, Greece, Bosnia, and Bulgaria were preferred (...) Jews were exempt from this service and until recently Armenians were thought to have also been exempt" ['Devşirme', Wikipedia: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devşirme>].

⁶⁴ An indicative enumeration includes the following (in chronological order): Zaganos Pasha, Mahmud Pasha and Rum Mehmed Pasha, Grand Viziers of Mehmet the Conqueror; Mesih Paşa and Koca Mustafa Pasha, Grand Viziers of Bayezid II; Yunus Pasha, Grand Vizier of Selim I; Pargalı İbrahim Paşa, Grand Vizier of Suleiman the Magnificent; Tezkereci Ahmed Pasha, Grand Vizier of İbrahim; Sürmeli Ali Pasha, Grand Vizier of Ahmed II and Mustafa II and; Moralı Damat Hasan Pasha, Grand Vizier of Ahmed III.

⁶⁵ Notably, maybe the three most important Ottoman military commanders in both land and sea, Gazi Evrenos, Zaganos Pasha, Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha, were Greek devshirme. These three men expanded and

the era of the Ottoman territorial, economic, and cultural rise and growth (14th-17th centuries). This fact speaks volumes for the Greekness of the empire, despite the pathetic effort of the nationalistic streams of the Turkish and Greek academies to obscure this reality.⁶⁷

The second aspect touches upon the Turkishness of the Ottoman dynasty itself, and has to do with the reproductive principle of the House of Osman (*Al-i Osman*) and the institution of the Imperial Harem (*Harem-i Hümayûn*).⁶⁸ Although the first Ottoman rulers were of purely Turkish origin, soon the Ottoman dynasty employed a policy of reproduction through Greek-Orthodox Christian women.⁶⁹ As a result, after the first two generations of Osman and Orhan virtually all offspring of the sultans were born of concubine mothers.⁷⁰ These women came to have an significant political function and power, influencing gravely the political life of the

consolidated the Ottoman domination in the Balkans and the Aegean during the 15th and 16th centuries [see for example Kitsikis (2003)].

⁶⁶ For instance, we can here mention Christodoulos (Atik Sinan), architect of Sultan Mehmed II during the 15th century, who built the Fatih Mosque. However, the most important among these Greek devshirme was the Cappadocian Greek Mimar Sinan (c. 1489/1490–1588), the chief architect and civil engineer of Suleiman the Magnificent, Selim II, and Murad III. He was responsible for the construction of more than 300 major structures and other more modest projects, such as his Islamic primary schools (*sibyan mektebs*). His apprentices would later design the Sultan Ahmed Mosque in Istanbul and the Stari Most in Mostar.

⁶⁷ “Some modern Turkish-nationalist inspired scholarship in particular often downplays the role of Greeks in the devshirme and Ottoman Empire in general, in contrast to other Balkan Christian groups, because Greece and Greeks are seen to embody Christian Orthodoxy itself and also to represent a real military and cultural threat to the Turkish nation: to acknowledge the important role of Greeks in the Ottoman government and military establishment in particular is to undermine the very Turkishness of the Ottoman Empire and its achievements” [‘Devşirme’, Wikipedia: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devşirme>].

⁶⁸ “The institution of the Imperial Harem played an important social function within the Ottoman court and demonstrated considerable political authority in Ottoman affairs, especially during the long period known as the Sultanate of Women” [‘Imperial Harem’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Harem; See also Iyigun (2011), p. 2]. “The Sultanate of Women was the nearly 130-year period during the 16th and 17th centuries when the women of the Imperial Harem (...) exerted extraordinary political influence over state matters and over the sultan, starting from the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent and his wife Hürrem. Many of the sultans during this time were minors and it was their mothers, the Valide Sultans, or their wives, the Haseki Sultans, who effectively ruled the Empire” [‘Sultanate of Women’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultanate_of_Women; Garbol (2009), p. 12; Freely (2011), p. 15].

⁶⁹ Peirce (1993), pp. 16-17.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* “Beautiful and intelligent slave girls were either captured in war (mainly Christian Europeans in the Balkans), recruited within the empire, or procured from neighbouring countries to become imperial concubines (*Cariyes*). The concubine with whom the sultan shared his bed became a member of the dynasty and rose in rank to attain the status of *Gözde* (the Favorite), *İkbal* (the Fortunate) or *Kadın* (the Woman/Wife). The highest position herself was the Queen Mother (*Valide Sultan*), the mother of the Sultan, who herself used to be a concubine of the sultan's father and rose to the supreme rank in the Harem. The *kadıns*, who numbered up to four, formed the group who came next in rank to the Queen Mother. Right below the *kadıns* in rank were the *ikbals*, whose number was unspecified. Last in the hierarchy were the *gözdes*. The favourite consort who was the mother of the crown prince and the other princes (*Haseki Sultan*), as well as the other *kadıns*, enjoyed a privileged position in the hierarchy of the harem” [‘Imperial Harem’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Harem].

empire and participating in the exercise of sovereign authority through their roles within the imperial family and harem [e.g. as “Queen Mothers” (*Valide Sultan*)⁷¹ or the sultan’s favourite consorts or wives (*Haseki Sultan*)].⁷² Ottoman sources attest the active role of royal mothers in preparing their sons to receive power and guiding them in its proper uses,⁷³ while it was not unusual for these women to act as regent for a minor or incompetent sultan, or to antagonize their own sultan sons in seniority.⁷⁴ As it was the case with the *devshirme*, a good deal of royal mothers and wives that exerted such matriarchical and political authority were fully or partly of Greek ethnic origin.⁷⁵ That is, both institutions show that the Greeks donored their blood –literally and figuratively- to their Ottoman homeland.

Coming back to the *rayah*-level, the position of educated and privileged Greeks within the empire improved significantly during the 17th and 18th centuries. During this period of Ottoman stagnation, reform and concessions of sovereignty to foreign “spheres of influence”, the multinational balance was disrupted and the Ottoman state tended to obtain a dualistic Turkish-Greek structure similar to that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.⁷⁶ As the empire began to feel its backwardness *vis-a-vis* the European powers, it increasingly recruited Greeks who had the kind of academic, administrative, financial and technical competences which the

⁷¹ Peirce (1993), p. 258.

⁷² *Ibid*, pp. 16-17.

⁷³ *Ibid*, pp. 17, 27. Pierce notes: “The most politically significant roles appear to have belonged to the sultan’s concubines (...) in their postsexual phase of their careers as mothers of princes. From the middle of the fifteenth century, and possibly earlier, when a prince left the capital for his provincial governorate, he was accompanied by his mother, whose role was to preside over the prince’s household and perform her duty of «training and supervision» alongside the prince’s tutor (...) [after his enthronement] the sultan’s mother naturally took charge of the royal household (...) While supreme authority in the Ottoman sultanate was exercised by a male, that authority in the late 16th century emanated from a household that was presided over by the female elder of the dynasty” [*Ibid*, pp. 23-24].

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p. 27; This occurred particularly in the 17th century, when a series of accidents necessitated regencies that endowed the position of Queen Mother with great political power [*Ibid*, p. 258].

⁷⁵ An indicative reference includes (in chronological order): Nilüfer Hatun, wife of Orhan I and mother of Murad I; Gülçiçek Hatun, wife of Murad I and mother of Bayezid I; Handan, wife of Mehmed III and mother of Ahmed I and Mustafa I; Kösem, wife of Ahmed I and mother of Murad IV and Ibrahim I; Emetullah Rabia Gülnuş, wife of Mehmed IV and mother of Mustafa II and Ahmed III. As regards the mother of Mehmed II himself, the views are contradictory. Kitsikis writes that Mehmed II was repeatedly referring to his Greek roots from his mother’s side and once he claimed that his family was coming from a Byzantine prince of the Komnenos dynasty that had previously established himself in Konya, converted into Islam and married a Seljuk princess [Kitsikis (2003), p. 118].

⁷⁶ Kitsikis (2003), p. 28.

larger Ottoman population lacked. Greeks made up the majority of the empire's translators (Dragomans), financiers, doctors and scholars and they started to occupy senior public offices directly and not through the devshirme system. Especially the Phanariots - a class of wealthy, well-educated Greek merchants and diplomats residing in the Phanar district of Istanbul - became very powerful.⁷⁷

The 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca and the 1779 Treaty of Aynalıkavak allowed Russia to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire on the side of its Greek-Orthodox subjects, with Tsar Catherine II and her successors establishing themselves as their protectors.⁷⁸ After that time the Greeks acquired even greater power, setting its own laws and tax system, while the Greek fleet under the Russian flag took over all the commerce in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea.⁷⁹ At the turn of the 19th century, the Greek-Orthodox millet became growingly independent with the establishment of its own schools, churches, hospitals and other facilities. However, with the parallel national awakening of the various ethnic groups within it and the subsequent formidable nationalistic competitions, the Rum millet began to splinter and degrade. From that point in the mid-19th century, many Ottoman Greeks started to turn to their Turkish compatriots, in their effort to safeguard their advantageous position within the imperial structure.

The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne terminated the Turkish-Greek symbiosis within the last ecumenical imperial structure of the Intermediate Region, which constituted the pinnacle of the hellenoturkic civilizational phenomenon. The Ottoman Empire, "the most beautiful kingdom of the world",⁸⁰ had officially ceased to exist. This time, the crown of Constantine

⁷⁷ 'Ottoman Greece', Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_Greece

⁷⁸ Kitsikis (2003), p. 62; Kitsikis (2006), p. 32.

⁷⁹ 'Rum Millet', Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rum_Millet.

⁸⁰ Rigas Feraios, *Draft Constitution*, 1797. Cited in Kitsikis (2003), p. 9. Rigas Feraios was an ethnic Greek writer, political thinker and revolutionary, remembered as a Greek patriot and national hero, a victim of the Balkan uprising against the Ottoman Empire and a pioneer of the Greek War of Independence ['Rigas Feraios', Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rigas_Feraios]. In his *Thourios* or battle-hymn (1797) he urged the

the Great had not found an heir, due to the 1917 deposition of the Romanovs who were the main candidates for the imperial succession.⁸¹ None of the Balkan kings -with the possible exception of Constantine I of Greece- had comprehended the ecumenicity of the Intermediate Region, whereas the Arab monarchs that appeared after 1916 in the various Arab provinces had never aspirations to Istanbul. Later on, we will see people yearning for the lost empire mainly among the Turks and the Greeks, i.e. the two peoples that had benefited the most from it.⁸²

2.2. Hellenoturkism as an ideology

As aforementioned, the ideology of hellenoturkism ascribes an overriding importance to the hellenoturkic civilizational phenomenon which was briefly presented in the previous section. Accordingly, it envisions the establishment of a Turkish-Greek political ensemble, that will accommodate this phenomenon.⁸³ But at which junctures did the hellenoturkic ideology appear and which were the impetuses behind it?⁸⁴ Who were its expressors and followers in each case? What were their aspirations and which was the resonance of the ideology in each of its various occurrences?

There are several historical instances when the hellenoturkic ideology emerged, as Kitsikis himself testifies. The first dates back to the late Byzantine and early Ottoman period of the 14th and 15th centuries; The second goes back to in the late Ottoman era –starting from the

Greeks and other orthodox Christian peoples living in the Balkans to revolt against the sultan. At the same year, he published draft republican constitution that he aspired to give to the Ottoman Empire after the overthrow of the sultanate; according to that, the Empire would have maintained the same territory, being renamed as Hellenic Republic [Kitsikis (2003), p. 222].

⁸¹ Kitsikis (2003), p. 260.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ Kitsikis (1998), p. 63.

⁸⁴ At this point, it is clarified that this study employs for the definition of ideology provided by Kitsikis in his piece 'Le Nationalisme', *Études internationales*, Québec, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 347-370 (1971), at pp. 357-358. Given that ideologies are a modern phenomenon, one can also speak of a hellenoturkic ideal (instead of a hellenoturkic ideology) as regards the pre-modern types of hellenoturkism.

Tanzimat reforms until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire- and collides with the first 100 years of the independent Greek state. The third appearance of hellenoturkism takes place in the late 1920s and early 1930s, during the simultaneous tenures of Atatürk and Venizelos. Finally, hellenoturkism revives in the late 1960s and early 1970s, shortly before the onset of the Aegean dispute and the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus. At the discursive level, Kitsikis enlivens and nourishes the hellenoturkic ideology unceasingly since 1966, as its leading theoretician under its contemporary form.

2.2.1. The surfacing of hellenoturkism (14th – 15th centuries)

According to Kitsikis, the origins of the hellenoturkic ideology should be traced in the 14th and 15th centuries, in this segment of the Byzantine elite and populace that opposed the plans of a pro-western group who sought the collaboration with the Latins against the Turks.⁸⁵ This endobyzantine conflict escalated in the final decades of the Byzantine state, when the last two Byzantine Emperors, John VIII Palaiologos (1392 –1448) and Constantine XI Palaiologos (1405-1453), attempted to forge an alliance with the West in their desperation before the rapidly advancing Ottomans. To obtain western aid, the two men accepted the papal demand for the union of the -separated since the Schism of 1054- Catholic and Orthodox churches, an act that inflamed stern dissatisfaction and stirred up vehement reactions among the laity and clergy in the demising Byzantium. As a result, the Byzantine society was deeply divided into two mutually hostile camps, with those in favor of the anti-Turkish coalition with the West being called “unionists” and those opposing it “anti-unionists”. The hellenoturkic ideal sprang from the ranks of the latter fraction, being articulated for the first time by one chief figure of the anti-unionist struggle.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Kitsikis (1998), p. 63. *See also* Kitsikis (1970).

⁸⁶ For the division of the Byzantine society and the Turcophile party in the Byzantine Empire, *see* Kitsikis (2003), pp. 135-140.

2.2.1.1. *The rise of the Greek Eastern Party*

Before starting our enquiry on the historical development of the hellenoturkic ideology, we should familiarize ourselves with the fundamental terminological duet of “Eastern vs Western Party” that encapsulates a long political, social and philosophical division within Hellenism. Notably, this partition is still reflected in the politics and popular culture of present-day Greece.⁸⁷ As the terms connote, the “western” and “eastern” “parties” represent the two segments of the Greek society that found themselves (psychically, rationally and/or for reasons of interest) closer to the West and the East respectively, in the course of the last eight centuries.⁸⁸ These parties developed their own Great Ideas (*Megali Idea*), which had the same objective (to benefit Hellenism) but entirely different ways to pursue it. This dynamic and recurrent dualism constitutes the general setting within which the hellenoturkic ideal was born, expressed and transmuted throughout history. As we will see, almost all hellenoturkists have been ideologically located to the Eastern Party, trying to elevate Hellenism through a partnership with the Turks. Contrariwise, the adherents of the Western Party were seeing the interests of Hellenism being served only through its attachment to the West, being traditionally and in their entirety anti-Turkish.

⁸⁷ In our times, the term “Eastern Party” has long been used by mainstream historians [e.g. Atwill & Atwill (2010); Toynbee (1964); Pellerin (1963)] in order to define the reaction of a section of the population in the Third World countries against Westernization and the import of Western values in their societies. Rather than a specific political party, the term refers to a current in the public opinion of the said countries opposed to a “Western Party” of modernizers who tend to accept Westernization as an inevitable phenomenon that finally benefits the overall progress of Third World societies. For the period before the 20th century, the concept of the “Eastern Party” should be considered from the civilizational point of view. Particularly in the History of Greece and Byzantium, this concept has been largely used by noted historians like Toynbee, Stavrianos, Vasiliev and Iorga at the beginning of the 20th century, as well as by Kitsikis since the 1960s [‘Eastern Party in Greece’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Party_in_Greece]. For Kitsikis’s schematic classification of the Eastern and Western Parties in modern Greece and Turkey, see Appendix III.

⁸⁸ The essence of the longstanding intellectual differences between the two parties was explained by the minister of Foreign Affairs of Venizelos in 1919, Alexandros Diomedes: “Monasticism, especially Mount Athos, a bastion of radical Orthodoxy (...) was overwhelmingly directing what we call today public opinion (...) This uncompromising Byzantine mentality as represented by the leaders of the reactionary party, Bryennios, Markos Evgenikos and Gennadius, with their Easternized psychosynthesis and their phanatical antipathy to any Greek classical education, was nearer to the mentality of the Eastern Turks than to the spirit of classical Antiquity which flourished in the West. The Byzantine and Muslim worlds with time and with their continuous promiscuity had adopted common characteristics (...) Both were anti-progressive and fatalists” [Diomedes, N. A. (1942), pp. 235, 371-372; Cited in ‘Eastern Party in Greece’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Party_in_Greece].

The division arose in the beginning of the 13th century, and more precisely after the 1204 sack of Istanbul by the western European and Venetian armies during the Fourth Crusade. In the aftermath of the capture of the city and the establishment of the Latin Empire in the position of the extinct Byzantine state, the Byzantine aristocracy that fled Istanbul founded three Greco-Byzantine successor states: the Empire of Nicaea, the Empire of Trebizond and the Despotate of Epirus. The former was created by the Laskaris family and was the largest of them. Furthermore, it was the only one aspiring openly to recapture the occupied Byzantine capital that was in its close proximity. During his struggle against the Franks, and under the influence of the First Renaissance that had started at the same period in Europe, the third Nicaean Emperor Theodore II Laskaris (1254 –1258) considered himself being at the head of a unational Greek state that had to adopt western civilization. This attitude of Laskaris signified the genesis of the western version of the Great Idea (that is, the fixation with capturing Istanbul and its perception as the destined capital of a purely Greek political entity), which since then and until 1922 became the sole advocacy of the Greek Western Party.⁸⁹

The goal of Laskaris was finally obtained by the last Emperor of Nicaea, Michael VIII Palaiologos, who recovered Istanbul from the Latins in 1261 and restored the Byzantine Empire. In order to ensure the viability of his state, he embarked on negotiations with the Pope for the re-unification of the Catholic and Orthodox churches under the papal jurisdiction. His efforts culminated in the Second Council of Lyons of 1274, where with a series of concessions in ecclesiastical matters the Byzantine envoys signed the union with the West. The unionist policy of Michael VIII Palaiologos was the forceps that brought the “eastern party” to life; as soon as the news of the Council reached Byzantium, the agreement was opposed at all levels of society that revolted under the headship of the monks and the

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

devotees of the deposed Patriarch Arsenios (known as Arsenites).⁹⁰ The disorder was met with a violent crackdown by the Emperor and the situation escalated almost to the level of civil war.⁹¹ Ultimately, the Arsenite party prevailed and the union of the churches was not implemented thanks to the violent opposition of the Byzantine populace to such a westernization process.⁹²

The schism that fractionated the Byzantines during that period continued and deepened until the second conquest of Istanbul, this time by the Ottomans.⁹³ The dilemma posed before them was now straightforward: either they would succumb to the West (sacrificing thus their religious and cultural identity), or they would find refuge under the auspices of the religiously more permissive Turks (who were culturally closer to them and with whom they had coexisted for centuries). During the first half of 15th century, the conflict between the Latinophiles and the pro-Turkish Eastern chunk of the Byzantine society culminated, with the

⁹⁰ “One of the chief anti-unionist leaders was Michael's own sister Eulogia, who fled to the court of her daughter Maria, Tsarina of the Bulgars, from where she intrigued unsuccessfully against Michael. More serious was the opposition of the sons of Michael of Epirus, Nikephoros I Komnenos Doukas and his brother John the Bastard [John I Doukas of Thessaly]: they posed as the defenders of Orthodoxy and gave support to the anti-unionists fleeing Constantinople. On 1 May 1277, John the Bastard convoked a synod at Neopatras that anathematized Emperor, Patriarch, and Pope as heretics. In response, a synod was convoked at the Hagia Sophia on 16 July where both Nikephoros and John were anathematized in return. John called a final synod at Neopatras in December 1277, where an anti-unionist council of eight bishops, a few abbots, and one hundred monks, again anathematized Emperor, Patriarch, and Pope” [‘Michael VIII Palaiologos’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_VIII_Palaiologos].

⁹¹ Geanakoplos (1959), p. 276. “Michael at first responded with comparative leniency, hoping to win the anti-unionists through persuasion, but eventually the virulence of the protests led him to resort to force. Many anti-unionists were blinded or exiled. Two prominent monks, Meletios and Ignatios, were punished: the first had his tongue cut out, the second was blinded. Even imperial officials were harshly treated, and the death penalty was decreed even for simply reading or possessing pamphlets directed against the Emperor. The Arsenite eastern party found widespread support amongst the discontented in the Anatolian provinces, and Michael responded there with similar viciousness” [‘Michael VIII Palaiologos’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_VIII_Palaiologos].

⁹² Speech of Dimitri Kitsikis in the ‘Türk-Yunan ilişkileri ve Barış’ symposium, organized by the Türk Kültür Vakfı, Istanbul, 19 December 1981. The text of the speech was given to the author by Kitsikis during his research at the Dimitri Kitsikis Foundation in July and August 2013. For a press report on the event, see ‘Yunanlı Prof. Kitsikis: Türk-Yunan işbirliği tarihi bir gerekliliktir’, *Cumhuriyet*, 20 December 1981; ‘Prof. Dr. Kitsikis: iki ülke çıkarları için biraraya gelmeliyiz’, *Hürriyet*, 20 December 1981; ‘Yunanlı Prof. Kitsikis: “Kıbrıs bunalımının sorumlusu Makarios’tur”’, *Milliyet*, 20 December 1981.

⁹³ Kitsikis (2003), pp. 135-136; Vasiliev (1952), pp. 656ff.

final victory given to the latter in 1453.⁹⁴ By achieving its primary goal of saving Hellenism (that is, Orthodox Christianity, as the two notions were virtually identical at that time) from its assimilation by the Catholic West, the Eastern party had managed to express the cravings of the vast majority of the Greeks who aligned themselves with its cause.⁹⁵ Moreover, it secured an advantageous position of the Greeks within the Ottoman state, as the second in rank ethnic group under the Turks.⁹⁶

The “Eastern-Western Party” dipole that was brought about by the polarization of the late Byzantine society resumed upon the Greek independence of 1829.⁹⁷ The first head of the independent Greek state, Ioannis Kapodistrias, is considered as the most prominent leader of the Eastern Party in the history of modern Greece.⁹⁸ The premature ending of his governorship (he was assassinated by pro-Westerners in 1831) signified the beginning of the political domination of the Westernists that continues in the country to date. After his death, a novel Great Idea was progressively developed in the bosom of the Western Party.⁹⁹ Their new

⁹⁴ Kitsikis (2003), pp. 135; Vasiliev (1952), pp. 656ff. After the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul, the few pro-Latin Greek intellectuals fled to the West, initiating the Italian Renaissance. Among the famous philosophers and theologians that fled to Italy at that time were Plethon and Bessarion.

⁹⁵ Kitsikis (1998), pp. 63-64. Indeed, as numerous historical sources testify, the vast majority of the Greeks were considering the Latins as subjugators and the Turks as liberators [for some accounts on that matter, see Kitsikis (2003), pp. 54-55].

Interestingly, a similar phenomenon was observed in the ecumenical empire of the East, i.e. China: “The concept of Eastern Party as a reaction to the West appeared in China already in the 17th century. In the last days of the Ming Dynasty the Chinese people were divided, like the Byzantines some centuries earlier, between supporters of Western Roman Catholics and supporters of the Manchus as Turkic Mongols. The first were collaborating with the "Franks", the second with the "Tatars". Finally, the Eastern Party prevailed and Beijing gave itself to the Tatars. Supported by the Jesuits, the Chinese Empress, wife of the last Ming, was baptized Roman Catholic under the name Anne, while the heir of the throne as a Catholic had taken the name Constantine. The two queen mothers as well as many members of the royal court were also baptized Roman Catholic. Queen mother Helen sent in 1650 a message to Pope Innocent X (1644-1655) as well as to the general of the Jesuits, begging for at least spiritual help for the rescue of the Ming Dynasty. Finally, the pro-Latin emperor Yongli was defeated” [‘Eastern Party in Greece’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Party_in_Greece; See also Kitsikis (2007)].

⁹⁶ *Supra*, note 91. See also above, 2.1.2.

⁹⁷ At the same period, this distinction also appeared for the first time among the Turks, with those wanting the modernization of the Ottoman Empire by the western standards and those defending its traditional identity.

⁹⁸ Koukkou (2003). Cited in ‘Eastern Party in Greece’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Party_in_Greece.

⁹⁹ The term “Μεγάλη Ιδέα” (Great Idea) itself was used for the first time in 1844 by the Greek PM Ioannis Kolettis. Kolettis had previously served as an ambassador in Paris for eight years and was the leader of the so-called “French Party” in Greece. He was aspiring to establish a purely Greek state of the modern French type in the position of the Ottoman Empire. After his death in 1847, the Greek newspaper *Αιών* published a series of

dogma dictated the expansion of the small Greek statelet toward Istanbul, resembling the expansion of the Empire of Nicaea in the 13th century.¹⁰⁰ It was inspired by the westernized Greek scholar Adamantios Korais, who was believing that the ancient Greek spirit had been forgotten by his compatriots during the Byzantine and Ottoman eras and should then be reclaimed through the forcible purification of the Ottoman lands from the regressive Eastern culture.¹⁰¹ As regards the Turks, the Greek Westernists were correspondingly despising them as backward and “Asiatic” people.¹⁰² Finally, they were relying heavily for the execution of their purgatorial mission on the assistance of the West, and particularly France.¹⁰³

This doctrine was mightily opposed by both the Greek Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate,¹⁰⁴ the two points of reference for the anti-Westernists who were sensing the traditional values of Greek-Orthodox Christianity being endangered by the West. Already since the mid-18th century, when the decline of the Ottoman Empire started to become evident, the Ottoman Greek Easternists were struggling to save the empire (of which they had traditionally been staunch supporters) through its transformation into a Orthodox Christian empire under the tutelage of the Greeks.¹⁰⁵ Their aspiration was initially spurred and backed by the coreligionist Russia. However, after the Russians dropped their support to aid the Balkan Slavs, the Greek Eastern Party became fervidly anti-Russian (and to some extent pro-German), pursuing parallelly an active cooperation with the ethnic Turks of the empire for the

articles with the title “Μεγάλη Ιδέα”, where it was argued that the expansionist policy of Kolettis was inspired by the French papists with the aim to exort Greeks from Orthodox Christianity [*Supra*, note 91].

¹⁰⁰ *Supra*, note 91.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* Kitsikis argues that this opposition was the reason of the founding of the new autocephalous Greek Church by the Westernist anti-religious liberals of Athens (and with the backing of France and England) in 1833 [*Ibid.*].

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* “The Greek Eastern Party generally disapproved the secession of Greece from the mother country which for them was the Ottoman Empire. They sincerely loved the Turks as their brothers. But they thought that the Turks were now in decadence and were not capable anymore to save the Ottoman Empire from collapse. So they, the Greeks, wanted to become the leaders of the Ottoman Empire in order to save it for the sake of the Turks as well” [*Ibid.*].

sake of both peoples and against the Slavic aggression.¹⁰⁶ In their effort to save the ecumenical claim of Hellenism, the Easternist Greek intellectuals devised alternative plans to the nationalist Great Idea of the Western Party, centered on the Turkish-Greek alliance.

The clash between the two schools of thought peaked in the 1910s, and especially during the so-called National Schism of 1914-1917. The leader of the Greek «Liberal Party», Eleftherios Venizelos was the last and greatest exponent of the Great Idea in those years,¹⁰⁷ during which this westernist doctrine took gradually a imperialistic twist. His policies were boldly challenged by thinkers such as Pericles Giannopoulos, Ion Dragoumis and Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaidis, as well as politicians like Ioannis Metaxas, who were all belonging in the Easternist faction.¹⁰⁸ As we will see below (2.2.2.2), especially Dragoumis and Souliotis-Nicolaidis were calling for a federacy of the Eastern peoples of the Ottoman Empire built around a Greek-Turkish core. Eventually, the 1922 Kemalist victory over the Greek army that had invaded Anatolia in 1919 put an definite end to the ambitions of both camps.¹⁰⁹ After that point, the Western Party directed its activities toward the furthest possible integration of Greece into the the political and economic structures of the West (such as NATO and the EU), whilst the Greek Easternists fortified themselves in reaction, condemning the strategical choices of the dominant pro-Western domestic elites.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, after 1922 a third kind

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* An incident that exemplifies the Greek stance in that period (although it comes from a member of the Venizelist party) took place on the 21st October 1908, a few months after the successful 1908 Young Turk. Addressing the leader of the new regime, Enver Pasha, the special envoy of the Greek Government to the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, MP Apostolos Alexandris, declared: “The Greek nation wishes wholeheartedly the Young Turks a full success in their undertaking. A strong Turkey will free the Greeks in Turkey from the oppression of the Slavs. If Turkey ever collapses, something that we neither wish nor believe it possible –but God’s will is unknown- we want to succeed her because it was from us that she acquired her European territories. But if the Slavs take them, this national dream will dissolve forever” [Alexandris (1947), p. 23. Cited *ibid* and in Kitsikis (1998), pp. 114-115].

¹⁰⁷ *Supra*, note 91.

¹⁰⁸ *Supra*, note 91; ‘Eastern Party in Greece’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Party_in_Greece].

¹⁰⁹ As Kitsikis has pointed out, “no Westernist Greek liberal believes today that Greece could expand territorially against the Turks, capture Istanbul and incorporate this city into a purely Greek nation-state. On the other side, no Easternist Greek would ever think today that Greeks could be leading an Ottoman Empire that has forever disappeared” [*supra*, note 91].

¹¹⁰ Kitsikis and a growing number of Greek scholars who have followed his path have openly supported the ideology of the Eastern Party in recent times [e.g. *see* Kitsikis (1970, August 1985); Romanides (1975);

of ‘Megali Idea’ that implies the founding of a modern-type Turkish-Greek confederation has periodically emerged. Under this refurbished version of the old Easternist proposals, any idea of domination of the Greeks over the Turks and *vice versa* has been abandoned in favour of strict equality between the two nations. This project first appeared in 1928 (see 2.2.3), was revived in 1968 (2.2.4), and persists until our days (2.2.5 and 3).

2.2.1.2. *George of Trebizond and his unifying efforts*

The first scintillas of hellenoturkism are found in Gregory Palamas (1296–1359), a monk of Mount Athos and a preeminent theologian of Hesychasm who is venerated as a Saint in the Eastern Orthodox Church.¹¹¹ He persistently fought against the supporters of the West and, after becoming the Archbishop of Thessaloniki, he showed vivid interest in Islam. Later on, he personally engaged into discussions with the Turks in Asia Minor and, after having ascertained their religious tolerance, he wished “the day to come soon that [the Greeks and the Turks] will understand each other”.¹¹² On the Turkish side, the initial sparks of hellenoturkism should be sought in all those who were at the same period realizing the Turkish-Greek civilizational phenomenon, like Sheikh Bedreddin (1359–1420).¹¹³ The contribution of Bedreddin in the synthesis of Islam and Christianity and the spread of Alevism during the first centuries of the Ottoman state is crucial, as his ideas became the official dogma of Musa Çelebi’s regime during the period of the Ottoman Interregnum.¹¹⁴ In 1416, he

Georgalas (1979); Metallinos (1990); Sardelis (1991); Yannaras (2006)]. After 1990, most Greek Easternists reinstated ties and maintain communication channels with Russia.

¹¹¹ Kitsikis (1998), p. 64. According to Kitsikis, Palamas symbolizes the spirituality and the eastern ascetism of the Intermediate Region [*Ibid*].

¹¹² *Ibid*, p. 63; Kitsikis (2003), p. 177; Kitsikis (2006), p. 27.

¹¹³ Kitsikis (2003), p. 64. Bedreddin was a renowned Sufi theologian, son of a kadi and his Greek wife, who was a daughter of a Byzantine commander [*Ibid*, p. 173; Ágoston & Masters (2009), p. 364]. The phenomenon of the mixed Turkish-Greek marriages was widespread in this period [Kitsikis (2003), pp. 173-174]; In accordance with the times, Bedreddin had learnt to read the Koran from his father and Greek from his mother; he had also been taught about Christianity, as most likely his mother would have continued to practice her religion [‘Sheikh Bedreddin’, Wikipedia:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheikh_Bedreddin#cite_note-1].

¹¹⁴ Kitsikis (2003), p. 173. For Bedreddin’s cohorts, Islam and Christianity were equally righteous [*Ibid*, p. 174; Kitsikis (2006), p 26].

instigated an unsuccessful Alevi uprising against the sultan with religious-communist ideas that heralded the full parity between Muslims and Christians.¹¹⁵

For Kitsikis, though, the founding father of hellenoturkic ideology in its pre-modern form is the Greek philosopher George of Trebizond (1395-1484),¹¹⁶ who aimed at synthesizing Turkish Islam (in the form of Bektashism) and Christianity (in the form of Eastern Orthodoxy).¹¹⁷ Although he was originating from Trebizond, he was born and lived in Crete that was under Venetian rule since 1204.¹¹⁸ There, the Latin oppression was such, that the Cretans -like the rest of the Greeks- were viewing the Turks as saviors.¹¹⁹ In the age of 30 or 35 he was taken by a Venetian patron to Italy, where he excelled as a philosopher and professor instructing Pope Paul II (1464-1471) himself.¹²⁰ In 1439 he accompanied the Byzantine Emperor John VIII Palaeologus as an advisor in the attempted union of the Catholic and Orthodox churches in the Council of Florence, together with other three Greek philosophers (Georgios Kourtesios Scholarios,¹²¹ George Amiroutzes¹²² and Basilios Bessarion¹²³).¹²⁴ The emperor hoped to use the possibility of re-uniting the churches in order

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 174; Kitsikis (2006), pp. 25-26.

¹¹⁶ Kitsikis (2003), p. 52.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 54.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*. For some scholarly testimonies of the Greek anti-Latin sentiments during that era, see Kitsikis (1998), pp. 45-46.

¹²⁰ Kitsikis (2003), p. 54.

¹²¹ After the Council of Florence, Scholarios (1400-1473) became a monk and led the anti-unionist struggle. This informal role was bestowed upon him by the most prominent figure of the anti-unionist camp, Mark of Ephesus, after the death of the latter in 1444. Mark of Ephesus had also followed the Emperor John VIII Palaeologus in Ferrara and Florence, where he refused to sign the Union of the Churches. Following the conquest of Istanbul by the Ottomans, Scholarios became the first Ecumenical Patriarch of the Ottoman period (from 1454 to 1464), under the name Gennadius II.

¹²² Amiroutzes (1400–1470), was a Pontic Greek Renaissance scholar and philosopher from Trebizond. Although he strongly supported the union of churches in the Council of Ferrara-Florence, upon his return to Istanbul he made statements against the papal primacy and the Filioque. As protovestiaris of the Greek Emperor of Trebizond, David Megas Komnenos, he persuaded the latter to surrender to the Ottomans without resistance. After the fall of Trebizond in 1461, he entered the service of Mehmed II as his advisor on Christianity and Greco-Roman philosophy, becoming very popular within the Ottoman court. [Kitsikis (2003), p. 138; ‘George Amiroutzes’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Amiroutzes].

¹²³ Bessarion (1403–1472) was a Byzantine scholar and tonsured monk, originating from Trebizond. He participated in the Byzantine delegation to the Council of Ferrara-Florence with his capacity as Bishop of Nicaea, being the most eminent representative of the unionist party (although he was originally an anti-unionist). His support to the Roman-Catholic church during the Council gave him the favour of Pope Eugene IV, who

to obtain help from Western Europe against the Ottomans. Although the four envoys unanimously signed the Union of the Churches, upon their return to Istanbul all but one sage complied with the will of the great majority of the Byzantine people, which rose with indignation against the decision.¹²⁵

In July 1453 (just two months after the fall of Istanbul), George of Trebizond drafted one treatise entitled “On the truth about the Christian faith” (*Περί της αληθείας της των χριστιανών πίστεως*),¹²⁶ which he sent to Mehmed II.¹²⁷ In that treatise, he tried to convince the new Emperor that there were no substantial differences between Islam and Orthodox-Christianity and it was thus for his profit to merge the two religions under his scepter.¹²⁸ If the Sultan had done so, it would be possible for him to put on an equal footing the Greeks and the Turks of his empire.¹²⁹ In other words, George of Trebizond aimed at lifting any obstacles for Mehmed II to set up his realm on an egalitarian hellenoturkic basis.¹³⁰ According to the philosopher, the benefit for Mehmed was that he could become - as the leader of two religions - the emperor of all those that were following these religions around the globe. In turn, this would have allowed for a unification of the entire Intermediate Region under a Turkish-Greek stewardship.¹³¹ Nevertheless, although Mehmed II was keeping an open mind vis-a-vis all religions, he did not follow the advice of his guest in Istanbul to the letter, as it is very doubtful if he could impose on his subjects such syncretism without risking rebellion.¹³²

invested him with the rank of cardinal in 1439. From that time, he resided permanently in Italy, doing much, by his patronage of learned men, while in 1463 was given the purely ceremonial title of Latin Patriarch of Constantinople [‘Basilios Bessarion’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basilios_Bessarion].

¹²⁴ Kitsikis (2003), pp. 55, 137.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 55, 137-138.

¹²⁶ Cited in Zoras (1954).

¹²⁷ Kitsikis (2003), p. 53.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*; See also Kitsikis (2006), p. 31.

¹²⁹ Kitsikis (1998), p. 68.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 68-69.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, p. 69.

¹³² *Ibid*; Kitsikis (2003), p. 54.

In his second letter to Mehmed II in 1466, George of Trebizond addressed him as the legitimate emperor of the Romans and the whole universe and as the common emperor of the Greeks (Romans) and the Turks. He wrote to him: “Nobody doubts that you are *ex officio* the emperor of the Romans. Because, indeed, emperor is the one who legally owns the seat of the empire. And the seat of the Roman Empire is Constantinople: thus, whoever owns this city legally, is the emperor. And it is not from men, but from God that you hold with your sword the aforementioned throne: therefore you are the legitimate emperor of the Romans (...) But he who is the emperor of the Romans is also the emperor of the entire globe”.¹³³ Notably, one year earlier (1465), when he had been sent by the Pope to Istanbul, he advised the Mehmed II to attack Italy and, as a result, he was arrested and imprisoned for treachery upon his return to Rome.

Kitsikis estimates that the hopes of George of Trebizond were not groundless. He knew that the young sultan was surrounded by Greeks –either selectees of the devshirme or former Byzantine officials- that were impregnated with the principles of Alevism-Bektashism and Orthodox Christianity. All these Greek confidants of Mehmed II had attempted the convergence of Islam and Orthodoxy through Alevism.¹³⁴ However, George of Trebizond’s effort did not have the aspired effect, at least to a full extent. The Conqueror followed the customary norm of the Intermediate Region, i.e. the recognition and tolerance of other religions under the condition that the populations of the different than the dominant creed should pay a specified levy. Nonetheless, he conceded to Greek Orthodox Church wide-ranging privileges and, hence, he laid the basis of a dual Turkish-Greek suzerainty that gradually evolved within the Empire until the 19th century.¹³⁵ That is, the Turks accepted the Greeks to become the second in rank ethnic group of the empire under the leadership of the

¹³³ Cited in Kitsikis (1998), pp. 67-68 and Kitsikis (2003), p. 56.

¹³⁴ Kitsikis (2003), p. 181; Kitsikis (2006), pp. 30-31.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

Ecumenical Patriarch, who since then worked closely with the Emperor in the management of the Ottoman dominions.¹³⁶ It is exactly this shrewd decision of Mehmed II that the Turkish-Greek condominium in the Ottoman Empire until the 19th century stemmed from.¹³⁷

2.2.2. The resurgence of hellenoturkism (1830 – 1920)

From the mid-1700s onwards, the western intervention in the declining Ottoman Empire posed the Eastern question.¹³⁸ The advent of western-imported nationalism in the Ottoman lands had as a result the gradual transformation of the millets into rebellious ethnicities¹³⁹ and a subsequent long and difficult process of nation-states formation. Although Greece was the first state to secede from the empire,¹⁴⁰ many Greeks –but also Turks and Arabs– promoted until the early 20th century the idea of rejuvenating the imperial structure instead of destroying it. All these persons were realizing that the empire was representing a common civilization,¹⁴¹ which was the only environment within which Hellenism could survive and flourish as it did for thousands of years. During this Ottoman “long 19th century” of westernization, hellenoturkism acquired a clear ideological substratum,¹⁴² retaining simultaneously its religious underpinnings.

2.2.2.1. Hellenoturkists in the Ottoman Empire

In the early 19th century, the Greek intellectuals attempted to reconceptualize the Rum millet. They argued for a new “Romaic” ethnic identity and a novel Byzantine-like polity, which

¹³⁶ Kitsikis (1998), p. 65.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 69; Kitsikis (2003), p. 140.

¹³⁸ As Wittek rightly points out, after the exhaustion of the expansionist vigor of the Ottomans following the seizure of Crete (1669) and the unsuccessful second siege of Vienna (1683), as well as the subsequent Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) that concluded the Austro-Ottoman War of 1683-1697, the Ottoman Empire entered a "slow and gradual path to decay" [Wittek (1938)]. Kitsikis himself regards the Eastern Question as an internal conflict of the Intermediate Region, in which the West intervenes [Kitsikis (2003), pp. 209-219].

¹³⁹ Kitsikis (2003), p. 225.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 53.

would include all Balkan Orthodox Christians. This implied the goal of reviving the Byzantine Empire through the establishment of a new multiethnic Greek state.¹⁴³ After the emergence of the independent Greek statelet in 1829, the majority of Greeks remained within the Ottoman Empire, being split –like those within Greece- into two streams: the nationalists (belonging to the Western Party) and the federalists (located in the Eastern Party).¹⁴⁴ The latter opposed the further disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and took a leading role in devising ideas for its gradual transformation into a Greek-Turkish federal entity.

Traditionally, the Rum millet had displayed greater loyalty to the empire than the other parts of the Ottoman society, mostly because the imperial edifice was shielding Orthodoxy against the heretic Catholics,¹⁴⁵ but also due to their psychological attachment to the ecumenical empire. However, the unionist ideas of many Ottoman Greeks in the 19th and 20th centuries were due to another factor: Already since the second half of the 18th century, their position had strengthened so much that they had an interest in the preservation of the Empire.¹⁴⁶ Characteristically, the post-1838 exposure of the empire to the mercy of European imperialism counter resulted in a significant number of Greek Orthodox entrepreneurs supporting the Ottoman homeland.¹⁴⁷ Hence, especially for the powerful Ottoman Greeks the formation of a Turkish-Greek state which would halt the further dissolution of the empire and in which they would be on equal footing with their Turkish compatriots was imperative for the maintenance of their privileges and their continuously upgrading status.¹⁴⁸ This explains why Ottoman Greeks were among the most ardent supporters of the 1839 Tanzimat reforms and the new supra-ethnic identity of «Ottomanism» that was endorsed by the Porte.¹⁴⁹ In this

¹⁴³ See for example, *supra*, note 78.

¹⁴⁴ Kitsikis (1985).

¹⁴⁵ Kitsikis (2003), pp. 229-230.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

¹⁴⁸ Mazis (2014), p. 255.

¹⁴⁹ “The public announcement of the *Hat-i Şerif* in 1839, the first official edict of the Reforms known as *Tanzimat*, but mostly the *Islahat Fermanı* that initiated its second period, constitute major turning points in the

period, many of them occupied high public offices in the reformed state apparatus.¹⁵⁰

The institutional platform for the mutual appropinquation of the Greek and Turkish Ottoman elites was freemasonry; indeed, from the mid-19th century onwards freemasonry played a key role in the development of the hellenoturkic ideology.¹⁵¹ Fifteen years after the proclamation of the Charter of Gulhane that launched the modernization of the empire and allowed for the influx of western liberal ideas to the Ottoman domains, freemasonry began to proliferate in the main Ottoman urban centers.¹⁵² The Greeks and the Turks (as well as the Jews and the Armenians) engaged actively in this growth of freemasonry, with most of the Ottoman masonic lodges being chaired by Greeks.¹⁵³ Besides that, the Greeks and the Turks cooperated at the same period in the Alevi circles.¹⁵⁴ Many of them were both masons and Alevis and, according to Kitsikis, it was their second capacity that brought them to the idea of a Greek-Turkish federation.¹⁵⁵ Several Greek and Turkish masons that were not concurrently Alevis developed a Greek nationalism of the type of the “Society of Friends” and a Turkish

production and enhancement of a new ideology, that of Ottomanism, which aimed to promote the equity among all the Sultan’s subjects on the basis of a common political consciousness which would made insignificant any religious or ethnical difference. This policy is already set into action since Mahmud II’s period (r.1805-1839). The ‘infidel’ Sultan, as he became known, after a series of rebellions of his Christian subjects (Serbian revolutions in 1804 and 1815, Greek revolution in 1821) he tried through a series of measures to wipe out the centrifugal powers and create the preconditions for the integration of the non-Muslims into the society and the administration (...)This was exactly the goal of this practice, paving the way to Ottomanism, which aimed at creating a society where all the powerful corporative groupings would be gradually dispersed and all the subjects would be transformed into citizens with equal rights and obligations vis-à-vis the Sultan” [‘Greco-Ottomanism’, Encyclopaedia of the Hellenic World (Constantinople): <http://constantinople.ehw.gr/Forms/fLemmaBodyExtended.aspx?lemmaID=11376>]. According to Kitsikis, Ottomanism does not follow under the category of nationalism (as nationalism requires the existence of a nation) but its was rather a supranational patriotism (which in reality is sentiment, love for the country which one considers his own [Kitsikis (1971), pp. 356-357].

¹⁵⁰ “The most important of all is that many of these laymen like the Greek-Orthodox Alexandros Karatheodoris Paşa (1833-1906), Yiankos Aristarchis Bey (1811-1897), Konstantinos Mousouros Paşa (1807-1885) and the Armenians Krikor Odian Bey (1834-1887), Ohannes Sakız Paşa (1830-1912), Servicen Efendi (1815-1897) were at the same time members of the Ottoman bureaucracy. Many of them had studied at the university schools that had been recently founded. Thus, they were properly instructed to become intermediaries between the Ottoman authorities and the communities. These people, Neo-Phanariotes and bureaucrats amiras, had made a good use of the non-Muslim participation process in decision-making and had embraced the Ottomanist ideology” [‘Greco-Ottomanism’, Encyclopaedia of the Hellenic World (Constantinople): <http://constantinople.ehw.gr/Forms/fLemmaBodyExtended.aspx?lemmaID=11376>].

¹⁵¹ Loukas (May – June 1993).

¹⁵² Dumont (1992), p. 105. Also, *see* Dumont (1983, 1989).

¹⁵³ Dumont (1992), p. 105.

¹⁵⁴ Kitsikis (2003), p. 253; Kitsikis (2006), p. 99.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

nationalism of the type of the Young Turks, which were conflicting to each other.¹⁵⁶ On the Turkish side, Namik Kemal was a typical example of a Bektashi and a mason that was upholding the Turkish-Greek confederacy.¹⁵⁷

In 1872, the successor to the sultanic throne, prince Murad, was initiated into the mysteries of masonry in the lodge “Progress” (*H Προοδος*), which was mastered by the powerful Phanariot businessman Kleanthis Skalieris.¹⁵⁸ Most of the 68 members of this lodge were Greeks and Turks, with Namik Kemal being among them.¹⁵⁹ Apart from Murad, two of his brothers (the princes Nurettin and Kemalettin), numerous royal courtiers, and other state officials also joined the lodge. Bound by close friendly and spiritual ties, Skalieris and Murad espoused together the idea for the creation of a Turkish-Greek state.¹⁶⁰ Interestingly enough, the Greek PM of that period, Epameinondas Deligeorgis, had also become a freemason and propangated the Greek-Turkish cooperation as a prerequisite for a "rebirth of the East from the East".¹⁶¹

Skalieris was an outspoken anti-Slav and believed that the dismemberment of the empire under the pressure of panslavism was contrary to the interests of both the Greeks and the Turks. He became active in the “neo-Ottomanism” movement, being the link of it with the British ambassador Sir Henry George Elliot.¹⁶² He was updating Eliot on this fastly growing bloc, enabling the latter to arrange his diplomatic activity and assist in the overthrowing of Murad’s uncle, sultan Abdulaziz.¹⁶³ Yet, the enthronement of Murat V on 30 May 1876 led to a short 93-day reign that did not allow him to implement possibly his hellenoturkic ideas and

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ Kitsikis (2003), p. 252; Kitsikis (2006), pp. 97-98.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ The private notes of Sultan Abdulhamid II reveal the intimate relationship between his older brother Murat and Skalieris. The two men were virtually inseperable, with the Ottoman prince having given Skalieris a carte blanche for entering the palace and even the harem. Murat was also paying frequent visits to Skalieris’s house in the district of Pera [Kitsikis (2003), p. 252; Kitsikis (2006), p. 98].

¹⁶¹ Kitsikis (2003), p. 253; Kitsikis (2006), p. 99.

¹⁶² Kitsikis (2003), p. 253; Kitsikis (2006), p. 98.

¹⁶³ Kitsikis (2003), p. 253; Kitsikis (2006), pp. 98-99.

deliver the Constitution that his supporters had sought. His ousting on 31 August 1876 triggered an ensuing political instability, which moved the empire closer to the disastrous war with Russia and marked the beginning of a 32-year reign of infamous absolutism by his brother, sultan Abdul Hamid II.

Apart from the institutional frameworks that helped hellenoturkism to evolve, there were exigent pragmatic reasons for its rekindling among the Turks and the Greeks. The main catalyst for the Turkish-Greek synergy was the appearance of the Russian-backed panslavism.¹⁶⁴ The creation of the Bulgarian state in the aftermath of the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War generated a big shockwave for Turks and Greeks alike, who were now facing a common threat for their interests. For the Turks, the 1877–1878 war dealt a decisive blow to Ottoman power in the Balkan Peninsula. The Russian army advanced up to San Stefano (just 10 kilometers off Istanbul), where the belligerents signed the homonymous preliminary peace treaty of March 1878. The humiliating for the defeated Ottomans agreement was endorsing a large Bulgarian state that included most of Macedonia, as well as an independent Serbia, Romania and Montenegro.¹⁶⁵ Since then, “San Stefano” became the Bulgarian Great Idea that guided the policy of the newborn Bulgarian state.¹⁶⁶ Except for their evidently competing disposition against their own nationalist desires, the Russian panslavism and the subsequent Bulgarian expansionism made Greeks reconsider their strategy for the advancement of their own interests. The rise of Bulgarian nationalism buried the idea of cooperation with the Christian Balkan peoples as a way to solve the Greek national question and prompted an alignment of the Greeks with the Turks in the Ottoman Empire, as well as a degree of

¹⁶⁴ Another important domestic development was the accelerated dismantling of the millet system since the 1860s, under the pressure of the various nationalisms. The formerly uniform Greek millet started to being split into many others Christian millets in order to meet the ethnic divisions of the Ottoman subjects. By 1875, the number of millets had risen to nine with an upward trend [Kitsikis (2003), pp. 233-234]. Accordingly, the Bulgarians and the Serbians separated themselves from the nationalized Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate, through the establishment of the autonomous Bulgarian Exarchate (1870) and the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church (1879).

¹⁶⁵ ‘Treaty of San Stefano’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_San_Stefano.

¹⁶⁶ Daskalov (2013), p. 209.

rapprochement between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire.¹⁶⁷

During the 1878 Congress of Berlin (which invalidated the Treaty of San Stefano, provided for a small independent Bulgarian principality, an autonomous Bulgarian province in Eastern Rumelia, and the return of Macedonia to the Ottomans), the Ottoman representative, Karatheodori Pasha, and the sultan Abdul Hamid's private banker, George Zarifis, set in action a plan for the establishment of a Greek-Turkish state.¹⁶⁸ Karatheodori and Zarifis were among the many Greeks working in the Ottoman state as high-level bureaucrats and financiers.¹⁶⁹ In July 1878, the British ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Henry Layard, mentioned a secret conversation that he had with Zarifis, during which the latter presented to him a project for the merger between Greece and the Ottoman Empire into a two-headed empire, in the model of Austria-Hungary.¹⁷⁰ Zarifis told the British diplomat that he had discussed this proposal with the affiliates of the sultan, who had approved it.¹⁷¹ The plan provided for Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia being annexed by the Kingdom of Greece, which would in turn come under the suzerainty of the sultan.¹⁷² This kingdom would have its own institutions and would have participated in the administration of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷³

Zarifis contacted Layard to ask for his aid in the fulfilment of one condition of the plan: the resignation of George I, who had ascended to the Greek throne in 1863.¹⁷⁴ Zarifis was convinced that Britain could persuade the Greek king to divest of his position.¹⁷⁵ Layard found Zarifis's proposal interesting and did not reject it in principle. However, the British government notified him that it could not provide any assistance without the express consent

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ Mazis (2014), p. 255.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ Kitsikis (2003), p. 251; Kitsikis (2006), p. 97.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ Kitsikis (2003), pp. 251-252; Kitsikis (2006), p. 97.

of the Sultan.¹⁷⁶ Thus, this idea failed to materialize and potentially avert the calamitous developments of the following years for both Hellenism and the empire.

2.2.2.2. *Hellenoturkists in the Kingdom of Greece*

As we saw above (2.2.1.1), the dominant form of Greek nationalism since the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece in 1830 was a messianic creed of imperial Byzantine restoration that later developed into the so-called “Great Idea” (*Megali Idea*), which heralded the incorporation of all unredeemed brethren to the Greek state.¹⁷⁷ After the 1853–1856 Crimean War, the Russians renounced their pan-orthodox protectionist policy (in the context of which they had backed the Greeks of both the Greek state and the Ottoman Empire on coreligionist grounds) for panslavism. As a result, the Eastern Party in Greece abandoned its Russophilia and shifted towards a dynamic pro-Turkism. This development created the hope of reinstating the unity of the empire, which had been parceled by the Slavic nationalisms and the Greek secession.¹⁷⁸ The most vocal proponent of a Turkish-Greek common state at this period was the Greek politician Georgios Typaldos-Iakovatos (1813-1882),¹⁷⁹ a member of the parliament of the Ionian Islands (1850-1863) and, since 1864,¹⁸⁰ an MP of the Greek parliament.

Typaldos-Iakovatos was one of the most radical members of the Eastern Party.¹⁸¹ He was deeply religious, placing Orthodoxy above ethnicity. He was not recognizing a Greek nation but only Romiosyne, of which the Kingdom of Greece represented only the one tenth.¹⁸² By that time, the notion of pan-hellenism of the Great Idea had reappeared in order to offset the

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ Kechriotis (2005), p. 60.

¹⁷⁸ Kitsikis (2003), p. 247.

¹⁷⁹ Metallinos (1990).

¹⁸⁰ That is, after the ceding of the ‘United States of the Ionian Islands’ (1815-1864) by Great Britain to the Kingdom of Greece with the 1864 Treaty of London.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸² Kitsikis (2003), p. 247.

Russian descent to the south and the growing hazard of panslavism.¹⁸³ For Typaldos-Iakovatos, this pan-hellenism was Romiosyne and in this “orthodox race” that was mostly included in the Ottoman Empire there was no place for the Russians.¹⁸⁴ As he once declared, since the beginning of the history of the Eastern Mediterranean, “where the Turk was putting his foot, there was Romiosyne”.¹⁸⁵

Like Namik Kemal, Typaldos-Iakovatos was envisioning an Ottoman homeland that would encompass the Turks and the Greeks.¹⁸⁶ On 25 November 1880, he stated in the Greek Parliament: “You would tell me that I am a Turcophile because I believe in the necessity of a union with Turkey. So, if Turkey wanted to think more wisely, I would recommend to it to incorporate and integrate in the Turkish state all the peoples that are part of it”.¹⁸⁷ He was discarding the word "Ottoman" and suggested that all the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire should be called “Turks”.¹⁸⁸ Iakovatos made many similar statements, which led his political opponents to accuse him for “turkomania”.¹⁸⁹ According to him, the Turks and the Greeks were of same racial and religious origins.¹⁹⁰ He contended that the ancestors of the Turks were indigenous Anatolian peoples, who simply changed their religion.¹⁹¹ While accepting that there were also Turks that came from Asia, he generally indicated that the Turks were an ancient people of the Aegean region.¹⁹² When the ancient Greeks became Christians, they remained Greeks; likewise, when the Turks became Muslims they did not cease to be Turks.¹⁹³ Finally, he reminded that the Byzantines and the Turks were using the same emblems (such as the crescent) and, as the Turks were continuing the Byzantine tradition

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*; Metallinos (1990), p. 263.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 249; Metallinos (1990), pp. 264-272.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ Kitsikis (2003), p. 247.

¹⁹⁰ Kitsikis (2003), p. 248.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

much more than the Greeks, the latter should also adopt the crescent as their symbol.¹⁹⁴

Moreover, Typaldos-Iakovatos was stressing that the Greek nation, its religion and its Church were preserved under the rule of Mehmed the Conqueror.¹⁹⁵ For Istanbul, he opined that it would not be in danger as long as it remains under Turkish control.¹⁹⁶ He openly wondered why should the Greek Kingdom occupy the city and invest an Orthodox Christian king since the sultan, the Shaykh al-Islām and the Muslims in general were also worshipping Christ and espousing his essence as Ruhollah (the God's spirit).¹⁹⁷ According to Iakovatos, this in itself was making the Sultan an equivalent to a Christian emperor.¹⁹⁸ In his view, the Muslims were brothers with the Christians and, if an Orthodox was not considering the former as his brothers, then in turn he should not consider himself as a Christian.¹⁹⁹ Therefore, the hate that the Russian Tsar had inculcated to the Orthodox Christians, abetting them to shed the blood of their Turkish brothers, should finish.²⁰⁰

Kitsikis's concluding assessment for Typaldos-Iakovatos read as follows: "He was a fervent hellenoturkist, not because he wanted to "sell" Greece to Turkey, but because he wanted to give a global dimension to Hellenism; he had an Alexanderian vision of expansion through a dialectic composition, similar to that of Mehmed the Conqueror who consciously considered himself a new Alexander the Great".²⁰¹ Yet, it was during the late 19th and early 20th centuries when this Alexandrian vision was expressed meticulously and in greater detail by two of the most renowned thinkers in the intellectual history of modern Greece.

As mentioned above, the Greek irredentist aspirations were on a collision course with similar

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.* See also Kitsikis (2003), pp. 108-109 [for the double-headed eagle that was concurrently employed as insignia by both the Byzantine Emperor and the Seljuq Sultan in the 13th century].

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

movements among other Balkan nationalists since the 1870s.²⁰² During this time of attempts to fend off the Ottoman Empire and counter rabidly competing Balkan claims (especially those raised by Bulgaria), some Greek patriots reached the conclusion that the outright realization of the Great Idea was unattainable and an alternative might be in order.²⁰³ Accordingly, certain Greek intellectuals started reconsidering the conceptual preconditions of the Great Idea and turned to the Turks.²⁰⁴

As a result, an alternative to the nation-state model was developed, that purported to rescue the ecumenical cultural claim of Hellenism. This was the so-called “Oriental Ideal” (*Ανατολικό Ίδανικό*) of Ion Dragoumis (1878-1920) and Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaidis (1878-1945), for a vast Eastern polity based on Hellenic-Greek culture. This shared vision of the two men accounted to an “evolutionary” variant of the Great Idea that was pursued by Greece at that time, being in essence another version of it that became the official dogma of the Greek Eastern Party during this era.²⁰⁵ Furthermore, it was a continuation of the “Helleno-Ottomanism” of the rich Greek circles in Istanbul,²⁰⁶ which implied the preservation and gradual Hellenization of the Ottoman Empire based on the Greek economic and cultural superiority over the Turks.²⁰⁷

For Dragoumis, the notion of “Hellenism” was not corresponding to a modern European nation.²⁰⁸ As the Greeks had their own culture and tradition, they had to produce their own Neo-Hellenic civilization without imitating the West.²⁰⁹ Nevertheless, this could only happen

²⁰² Mazis (2014), p. 255.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ Characteristically, Dragoumis had declared: “I see within Greeks the hidden vigor (which will allow them), while searching for new formulas, to build in the East an Eastern State or an Eastern Federation out of nation states in each of which the foreign eastern communities could live as autonomous” [Sotiropoulos (1987), p. 169. Cited in Kechriotis (2005), p. 61].

²⁰⁶ *See supra*, note 138?

²⁰⁷ Hellenoturkism’, Wikipedia: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hellenoturkism>.

²⁰⁸ Kechriotis (2005), p. 60.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

beyond the limits of the Greek state, in the areas where Hellenism has been historically active and, specifically, in the territories of the Ottoman Empire.²¹⁰ Hence, Dragoumis held that the interests of Hellenism were best served not by the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and its replacement by a Greek nation-state,²¹¹ but rather by the survival of the empire through a cooperation of the Greek and the Turkish element. Considering the equal threats posed to Hellenism and the Ottomans by Bulgaria²¹² and the great powers, Dragoumis believed that the differences between Greece and the Ottoman Empire could be bridged and lead to the formation of a Turkish-Greek “Eastern Federation” (*Ανατολική Όμοσπονδία*).²¹³ In view of the Bulgarian nationalism and the intrusive policies of the European states, he was foreseeing a situation in which an exhausted Turkey might be easy to manipulate and even willing to accommodate Greek nationalist demands.²¹⁴ He was admitting that the fate of the nation was to coexist with other ethnicities -as it had been the case for centuries- but at the same time he was clearly suggesting that the Greeks would play a leading role in this ethnic communion.²¹⁵

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹¹ Dragoumis accused the Greeks of the State of having become ‘Helladites’ (the citizens of Hellas) [Dragoumis (1911), p. 2; Cited in Kechriotis (2005), p. 60. Similarly today, Kitsikis often distinguishes between ‘Hellenes’ (the cosmopolitan Greeks) and ‘Greeks of the Interior’ (those that reside in the Greek state) [e.g. see his blog ‘Endiamese Perioche’: <http://endiameseperioche.blogspot.de>].

²¹² “Dragoumis became the soul and the brain of the successful Greek attempt to counter Bulgarian influence in Ottoman Macedonia during his three years (1902-1905) as secretary to the Monastir consulate” [Mazis (2014), p. 257].

²¹³ That is, by admonishing for cooperation and coexistence of the Greeks with the Turks in a federated Greek-Ottoman state, Dragoumis went against the ideology that dominated modern Greece almost from the moment of its inception [Mazis (2014), p. 267].

²¹⁴ Mazis writes: “Dragoumis hoped that this Eastern Idea of the Greek-Turkish state would have fulfilled a number of goals as far as the Greeks were concerned. More specifically, the plan would have advanced the irredentist needs of the Greek state, notwithstanding without outright annexation of land, while protecting the interests of the 1,500,000-2,000,000 Greeks living in the Ottoman Empire. As it appeared on paper, the new state would have been strong enough to counter the attempts by the Slavs (Russians and Bulgarians) to annex territories that Dragoumis considered Greek [*Ibid.*].

²¹⁵ Kechriotis (2005), p. 60. As Augustinos has pointed out, was heavily attracted by social Darwinism, and supported the idea of ‘natural’ competition among nations in which only a few could survive. The Greeks would surely win this competition [Augustinos (1977), pp. 88-89. Cited in Kechriotis (2005), p. 61]. Mazis presents an Dragoumis’s thought shaped by cultural parameters. He notes: “While Dragoumis’s Eastern Idea was in great part based on pragmatic considerations, such as diplomatic dynamics of the time, he was also motivated by his beliefs about the role of Greece vis-à-vis both East and West. His thoughts on the subject are an integral part of his Eastern Idea and shed light on his way of thinking about the subject. Greece, like Russia and the German Empire, noted Dragoumis, is located somewhere on the border between East and West [similar to Kitsikis’s ‘Intermediate Region’]. On the one hand, the West had been beneficial to Greece inasmuch as it helped the

After their successful 1908 revolution, the Young Turks restored the suspended Ottoman constitution of 1876 and reinstated the Ottoman parliament.²¹⁶ This development was welcomed with furor and utopian excitement by both the Greeks in the empire and the Greek state.²¹⁷ The widespread euphoria drifted Dragoumis as well, who started to think that the Young Turks regime would create together with the Greek element of the empire a Turkish-Greek political partnership.²¹⁸ Around that time Dragoumis embarked on some initial planning of the main features of his Eastern Federation, drawing inspiration from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.²¹⁹ If the federated Turkish-Greek state was to emulate Austria-Hungary, the Greeks were to play the role of the Hungarians, i.e. that of the junior partner bestowed with broad administrative, political, and cultural freedoms.²²⁰ By the time that Dragoumis visited the Habsburg state in 1910, the Hungarians had been already allowed to control parts of the empire populated by non-Magyars (such as the Slovak lands), ruling *de facto* an empire within the empire.²²¹ In the same pattern, Dragoumis was aspiring a polity in which the Turks and the Greeks would be corulers and, at the same time, the latter would retain wide powers, especially vis-a-vis other Christian ethnicities.²²²

Greeks to better understand themselves and their ancient past. On the other, the West viewed modern Greek culture as inferior, or at best a bad copy, of its modern Western counterpart. While Greece was in a position of weakness vis-à-vis the West, Dragoumis believed that Greek culture could deal with the East from a position of strength” [Mazis (2014), p. 260].

²¹⁶ The Ottoman constitution (*Kanûn-u Esâsî*) and parliament (*Meclis-i Umumî*) had been suspended by Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1878.

²¹⁷ Kitsikis (2003), p. 256.

²¹⁸ Mazis (2014), pp. 262-263.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 263. “On a trip to Austria-Hungary in October 1910, Dragoumis was impressed by the three different languages often encountered in public spaces such as on street signs and in railroad stations. He noted that Austria allowed the subject peoples the freedom to manage their religious, cultural and educational affairs. He also commented on the fact that the various peoples enjoyed equal political rights with the Austrians in the empire as a whole, while at the same time they enjoyed local autonomy and even, in the case of the Hungarians, controlled their own parliament. The Hungarians and the Austrians were governing their respective halves of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but in questions of federal foreign policy and defense the Hungarians had veto powers. At the same time, the Hungarians were given a free hand in administering their ancestral territories and excersised control over the non-Hungarian people who resided there” [*Ibid.*].

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² *Ibid.*

As regards its political system and organization, Dragoumis's Eastern Federation was imagined as a loose confederation, with significant powers devolving from the central government to the autonomous constituent units. The authority of the federal government were to be limited, while state, municipal, and local elected bodies could run their own affairs.²²³ Albeit a democratic state, the voters would only have an indirect role in electing their representatives.²²⁴ Finally, the federation was purported to be a secular state, with a Muslim monarch as its figurehead.²²⁵ Everyone would be free to worship in any faith, but religious institutions and leaderships were to be firmly placed under the control of the supreme political authority.²²⁶

After his election to the Greek parliament in 1915, Dragoumis became a foe of Venizelos and his pro-Entent policies.²²⁷ Dragoumis had previously condemned the 1912 Venizelist policy for the sharing of the Balkans among Greece and the Slavic nation-states of the region. As Kitsikis has pointed out, the Greeks fighting against the Ottoman Empire in order to share it afterwards with the Slavs was in Dragoumis mind like attacking their own heritage in order to collect afterwards only a part of it.²²⁸ His party was preparing to challenge Venizelos in the 1920 elections, but an attempt on Venizelos's life a few months earlier set in motion a series of countermeasures by his supporters that culminated in the assassination of Dragoumis by Venizelist paramilitary troops.²²⁹ Hence, Dragoumis did not live to witness the repercussions of the protracted preponderance of the Western Party and its Great Idea in the politics of

²²³ *Ibid*, p. 266.

²²⁴ *Ibid*.

²²⁵ Dragoumis was himself secular.

²²⁶ Mazis (2014), pp. 266-267. Mazis notes: "While the interests of Hellenism remained paramount in Dragoumis's plans, his proposed state (strong, prosperous, modern and democratic) would have also bestowed benefits upon all its citizens. The people of the Eastern Federation, regardless of their ethnic background or religion, would be free to pursue their interests and become the beneficiaries of a social, political, and economic renaissance" [*Ibid*, p. 267].

²²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 255.

²²⁸ Kitsikis (1998), p. 174; Kitsikis (2003), p. 263. The main political figure of the Eastern Party of that time, Ioannis Metaxas, employed later the same reasoning against Venizelos, by asserting that "with the Venizelist policy of distribution, Hellenism was mutilated and failed" [*Ibid*].

²²⁹ Mazis (2014), p. 255.

modern Greece, namely the sacrifice of the ecumenical concept of Hellenism that lost its *raison d'être* with the 1922 catastrophe in Asia Minor.²³⁰

Souliotis-Nicolaidis was the other like-minded intellectual of the same period. From 1908 to 1912, Souliotis-Nicolaidis had founded in Istanbul a secret society called *Ὀργάνωσις Κωνσταντινουπόλεως* (Organization of Constantinople). This organization worked closely with Dragoumis, and was supported by the Greek MPs of the Ottoman parliament, the Ecumenical Patriarch and the government of Athens.²³¹ Like his cordial friend Dragoumis, Souliotis-Nicolaidis had opposed the 1912 Balkan Alliance, because for him the Ottoman Empire was the guardian of the Anatolian civilization.²³² Consequently, it was the natural hinterland of Hellenism and, thus, the cooperation of the Greeks with the Slavs in order to plunder their own “home” was a pure insanity.²³³ For Souliotis-Nicolaidis, the sharing of the empire equaled the destruction of the Intermediate Region and its culture, with the West ultimately dominating over the ruins.²³⁴

Similar to Dragoumis, hellenoturkism formed the ideological basis of Souliotis-Nicolaidis's struggle.²³⁵ He was not in favor of either the sophisticated Byzantine-Ottoman ecumenism of Ferraios and the Young Turks, or the Greek separatist nationalism of the Great Idea.²³⁶ His ideology was based on two realities: the cultural identity of the Eastern Mediterranean and the nations composing that region.²³⁷ He was not espousing the existence of a Byzantine or Ottoman “nation” and, instead, he was believing in the existence of many different nations, like the Greek and the Turkish, which should be united in a federation in order to maintain the

²³⁰ Daskalov (2013), pp. 214-215.

²³¹ Kitsikis (2003), pp. 256-257.

²³² *Ibid.*, p. 263; Kitsikis (1998), p. 174.

²³³ *Ibid.*

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

cultural identity of the area.²³⁸ After the creation of such a federation, it would be possible to proceed to a second “supranational” phase, with the creation of an “Eastern race”.²³⁹ The racial amalgamation of the various ethnicities into a single nation was to emerge as a result of the Eastern peoples’ will.²⁴⁰ His only difference compared to Dragoumis was that he did not necessarily prioritize the Greek element, but hankered after the preservation of the entire mosaic of the Ottoman multi-communal society that exerted a considerable charm to him.²⁴¹

To this end, Souliotis-Nicolaidis also called for political unity which necessitated the establishment of an “Eastern State”.²⁴² He was also excited with the new Young Turks regime that was “creating an atmosphere of fraternity among the nations of Turkey, i.e. all “Eastern nations”.²⁴³ For him, the constitutional liberties promulgated by the Young Turks permitted the Hellenism of the Ottoman Empire to articulate and pursue openly a political program, whose eventual objective should be the federation of the nations and states of the East.²⁴⁴ Accordingly, he advocated waging war against the Bulgarians who were posing a threat to such a plan.²⁴⁵ At the same time, he was expressing his confidence for the salvation of Hellenism, despite the fluid political circumstances of that era.²⁴⁶

Apparently, both Dragoumis and Souliotis-Nicolaidis advocated what Veremis has called an

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁰ Panayotopoulos (1980), p. 363. What is interesting is that, according to Dragoumis’ words, Souliotis-Nicolaidis could see ‘the creation of a new race out of all the ethnicities of Turkey as a hope for all humanity’ [Dragoumis (1911), pp. 116-117. Cited in Kechriotis (2005), p. 61].

²⁴¹ Kechriotis (2005), p. 61.

²⁴² *Ibid.*

²⁴³ Veremis and Boura (1984), p. 61. Cited in Kechriotis (2005), p. 61.

²⁴⁴ Kechriotis (2005), p. 61.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.* According to Kechriotis, Souliotis-Nicolaidis was attributing to Hellenism a much broader definition: “The political character of ‘Hellenism’, according to Souliotis-Nicolaidis did not derive from the Western republican ideology but from the ancient Greek tradition of democracy” [Kechriotis (2005), p. 61]. Thus, he declared in agony: “If only I could put that in everybody’s consciousness (...) they would turn there and would find at the end a political system that would unite them, a political system which would not imitate the well-known European ones” [Veremis and Boura (1984), p. 62. Cited in Kechriotis (2005), p. 61]. Correspondingly, Daskalov contends that “the Oriental Ideal was directed primarily against Western Europe and its civilization (the “Franks”), with all Balkan peoples being given a place in the envisioned Eastern polity based on their culture and civilization that distinct them from the West” [Daskalov (2013), p. 214.]

“imaginary stateless nation”.²⁴⁷ The two men did not scorn the “nation-state” concept as such, but they were denying the western identification of the nation with the state.²⁴⁸ Certainly, it was not the first time that this idea of a nation beyond state had popped up. As Kitromilidis has noted, the allocation of a cultural dynamism and integrative force to Hellenism that could allow it to assimilate diverse elements (without really referring to a political unity), had been a recurring theme since the mid-18th century, after the infiltration of European Enlightenment ideas through the Ottoman lands.²⁴⁹ However, under Dragoumis and Souliotis-Nicolaidis the discourse gained for the first time an open antiwestern inflection, as both intellectuals based their argumentation on a clear civilizational predilection for the East and a parallel rejection of the western cultural and political precepts.

Unfortunately for Dragoumis and Souliotis-Nicolaidis, their dreams for a union of the Greek and the Turkish people in an Eastern Federation entity failed to materialize and prevent the coming tragedies for Hellenism and the Ottoman Empire. According to Mazis, the main reason for that was the area’s long history, characterized by a reciprocal resentment between the Turks and their subject peoples.²⁵⁰ Also, the non-realization of the Turkish-Greek state can be attributed to the fact that such ideas remained limited to discussions among certain members of the elite, and were not communicated to a wider audience.²⁵¹ As a result, the proposals for an Eastern supranational cooperation remained a mere talk and did not gain

²⁴⁷ Veremis (1990), pp. 17-18.

²⁴⁸ Kechriotis (2005), p. 61.

²⁴⁹ Kitromilidis (1992). Cited in Kechriotis, p. 62.

²⁵⁰ Mazis (2014), p. 269. “For most Greeks, Armenians, and other minorities, the Turks represented not a future partner but an enemy and oppressor. Following a number of wars between Turkey and its former subject peoples, culminating in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, most Turks were also unwilling to cooperate. The tragic history of the Armenian genocide illustrates why the idea of an Eastern Federation was premature or even impossible. It clearly demonstrates how deep and impossible to heal was the animosity between the peoples of the Near East (...) A modern and democratic multiethnic state, of the type the Eastern Federation could have become, would have been able to prevent such tragedies. The fact that it took the major trauma of the WWII to push the Europeans closer indicates that the 1920s were too early for such developments” [*Ibid*, pp. 269-270].

²⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 270.

popular support or any real traction in the popular political discourse.²⁵² Furthermore, the two men did not grasp the shifting diplomatic landscape of their contemporary world, despite Dragoumis's long diplomatic experience. First, they underestimated the significance of the national question for the other Balkan peoples. Second, although the potential of the Eastern Federation remained untested, it would probably have been a powerful competitor and an obstacle to the geopolitical and economic planning of the European powers, which would not have allowed its creation.²⁵³ Finally, the general spirit of the times after the end of WWI was moving in a completely different direction,²⁵⁴ marked by catholic celebration of the Wilsonian idea of self-determination and the heyday of the nation-state model. In such a conjuncture, the creation of multiethnic entities was strikingly anachronistic, with the trend being the segmentation of the existing imperial structures into several tiny nation-states, rather than the emergence of new powerful ensembles.²⁵⁵

All hellenoturkic exercises in both the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece in the period between 1830 and 1920 took place in a peculiar political climate. They intended to

²⁵² *Ibid.* Mazis adds another credible reason: "Also, the European states that came together in the 1950s to create the nucleus of today's EU [for Mazis, the Eastern Federation would have resembled the EU experiment] were at a more advanced stage economically, socially, [industrialized] and politically [with long tradition of democratic governance] than the areas that would have been partners in the Eastern Federation. In contrast, the Balkans and Anatolia were still agrarian-based societies with very little, if any, experience with democratic governments and modern societies [*Ibid.*, p. 271].

²⁵³ According to Mazis, "although Dragoumis and like-minded thinkers thought of the Eastern Federation as a solution to the ethnic problems of the Balkans and the Near East, their plan would have had wider implications" [*Ibid.*, p. 267].

²⁵⁴ "The Eastern Federation was a departure from the conventional political wisdom of its time. Indeed, part of its allure and interest today stems from its originality. In the early twentieth-century Europe, two paradigms of viable states reigned supreme. One was that of the nation-state as represented by countries such as France or Italy, where the overwhelming majority of the people were identified as having a shared language, culture and religion. The other alternative consisted of a multi-ethnic empire such as Russia or Austria-Hungary. In both empires, the population was diverse with different linguistic and cultural characteristics. In the case of Russia, the dominant group attempted with little success to retain power by pushing the minorities to integrate linguistically, culturally, and even religiously. In the case of Austria-Hungary, the dominant group gave up part of its power and created a partnership with one of its minority groups (Austrians and Hungarians). The Eastern Federation was an attempt to forge a new course: the creation of a federal state on a voluntary basis. In the Eastern Federation, there would be no dominant group but rather a voluntary association of people who would agree to a union in order to safeguard their interests from infringement by more powerful states (or dangerous adversaries). The Eastern Federation represented a new paradigm, for its time, of a modern state" [*Ibid.*].

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 270-271. As we will see below (2.2.3), later developments in Europe soon curbed this trend. The developments in question were i) Aristide Briand's plan for European union and ii) Alexander Papanastasiou project for the Balkan Federation [e.g. see Kitsikis (July-September 1965)].

curb a foreordained flow of things and avert certain collateral damages for Hellenism and the Ottoman Empire alike, through the reform of the latter into a federalized entity led by the Turks and the Greeks. Their pedestal and objective was to allow Greeks and Turks to resist inside and outside pressures (from the Slavs and the West respectively),²⁵⁶ through the conservation of the Ottoman Empire -which was continuously splintering by the various Balkan nationalisms and the western intervention- and the development of the Greek nation - which was scattered throughout the multiethnic Ottoman realms. As Kechriotis correctly argued, “the reshuffling of power relations in the area opened the ground for the creation of utopias which, under the prevailing enthusiasm and belief to the possibility of change, did not look as utopias at all, at least to their inspirers”.²⁵⁷ Ultimately, the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars put a bloody end to all these ambitious plans.

Reflecting on the originality and unfulfilled promise of the Eastern Federation, Mazis wrote: “Considering the history of the Near East since the Great War, the importance of a strong Eastern Federation becomes evident; one wonders how successful outside powers would have been in controlling either physically or economically parts of this sensitive area of the world with its strategic location and oil reserves. The existence of a strong Eastern Federation would have changed the diplomatic dynamics of the area, and the Europe in general, with unforeseen impact on such developments as the Second World War and even the Cold War”.²⁵⁸ Yet, this ‘original’ idea of the hellenoturkists of that era was soon to be resurrected, in a new context and with unexpected protagonists.

2.2.3. The third emergence of hellenoturkism (1928-1933)

2.2.3.1. The end of the centennial Greek-Turkish war

²⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 255.

²⁵⁷ Kechriotis (2005), p. 62.

²⁵⁸ Mazis (2014), p. 269.

In 1923, the centennial Greek-Turkish war that had started with the Greek Revolution of 1821 was terminated. The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 had already put a decisive blow at the plans for a Turkish-Greek state.²⁵⁹ The Turkish-Greek War of 1919-1922 was the last act of a lingering drama, which ended formally with the Lausanne Treaty of 1923.

The 1923 arrangement was the bitter corollary of a military effort, dictated by a deliberate political choice of the westernist political elites in Greece. As the last expressors of the Greek Western Party, the Venizelists attempted to enclose Hellenism within a purely Greek nation-state through the farthest possible materialization of their nationalistic Great Idea.²⁶⁰ Already with his post-1910 policy of a Balkan alliance against the Ottomans, Venizelos had consciously accepted the sharing of the Balkans among the various nation states of the region that had seceded from the empire. His tactic led to prolonged population transfers and exchanges that lasted over a decade, resulting in the uprooting of Hellenism from the Balkans and Asia Minor, and its confinement within the limited borders of a small unitary Greek political entity.²⁶¹ At the same time, the cataclysmic events of that period facilitated the ascent of modern Turkey under the fathership of Kemal Atatürk, who saved Turkism from extinction and exalted the national sentiment of his people.

Ironically, and in spite of the severe rupture and the recent trauma caused by the Greek expansionist military campaign in Anatolia and the Turkish War of Independence against the Greek invader, hellenoturkism was soon revived by Venizelos and Atatürk more vigorously than ever. The two gifted leaders and former enemies initiated an unprecedented Greco-

²⁵⁹ Kitsikis (2003), p. 257.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 261.

²⁶¹ Kitsikis (2003), p. 262. According to Kitsikis, it was not a by result erroneous decision; Venizelos should have predicted that his Balkan portioning policy would have automatically resulted in the exchange of populations [*Ibid.*, p. 265]. “The blame for the disaster was put by the Greeks – and still does to a great extent to date – monotonously on the great powers; but it was not Europe, it was Venizelos that had mainly intervened in Asia Minor, accepting, in full awareness, to serve the aims of British imperialism in order to be able to realize the nationalistic Great Idea” [*Ibid.*, p. 273]. Also see ‘Yunan asıllı Profesör ‘İzmir’in işgalinde Yunan mezalimi uzun süre önlenemedi’, *Tercüman*, 12 November 1981.

Turkish rapprochement, which launched a short period of cordial relations between the two countries and peaked in the idea of setting up a Turkish-Greek confederation.

2.2.3.2. The restorative federalism of Venizelos and Atatürk

After the disaster in Asia Minor and his dramatic failure to incarnate the irredentist Great Idea, Venizelos adapted substantially its policy upon his triumphant return to power on 19 August 1928.²⁶² His primary concern was to establish normal relations with Turkey and, thus, on 30 August 1930 he sent the following letter to the Turkish PM Ismet Inonu: “Mr. President, in this moment that the Greek people entrusts upon me with a strong majority the leadership of its Government for a period of four years, I would like to assure you about my strong wish to contribute to the normalization of the relations between our two countries that would ensure for them an intimate friendship, which would in turn result in a treaty of friendship, non-aggression and arbitration of the greatest possible extent. I am fully aware of the fact that Turkey has no aspirations over our territories and I was often given the opportunity to publicly state during the electoral campaign that Greece has no aspirations over the Turkish territories and accepts sincerely and unreservedly the peace treaties”.²⁶³ Inonu hailed this initiative with an equivalently warm response: “With particular satisfaction I took knowledge (...) of the content of this letter, which fully reflects my own views and marks the beginning of a new era of frank and honest friendship in the history of Turkish-Greek relations”.²⁶⁴

On 10 June 1930, Greece and Turkey signed in Ankara the convention “On the final settlement of the issues arising from the implementation of the Lausanne Treaty and the Athens Agreement relating to the population exchange”. The convention resolved all the

²⁶² Kitsikis (1995a), p. 21.

²⁶³ Letter of 30 August 1928. Cited in Kitsikis (January-March 1969), p. 118; Kitsikis (1995a), p. 21.

²⁶⁴ Letter of 27 September 1928. Cited in Kitsikis (January-March 1969), p. 118; Kitsikis (1995a), p. 21.

pending issues pertaining to the properties of the exchangees and was presented by Venizelos as a historical starting point of the Greek-Turkish reconciliation.²⁶⁵ On 25 October of the same year, Venizelos visited Turkey for the signing of a treaty of friendship upon an invitation of Atatürk.²⁶⁶ The Turkish President treated his invitee warmly, with the streets in Ankara being decked with Greek flags.²⁶⁷ During that visit, the two leaders discussed the possibility of a partnership or federation between the two countries.²⁶⁸ The political willpower of the two men is attested by the fact that they both went against the tide; Venizelos moved forward with the agreements despite accusations of conceding too much on the issues of the naval armaments and the properties of the Ottoman Greeks, whilst Atatürk resisted the pressures of historic enmities and the Turkish animosity against the Greeks stemming from the events of the last decades.²⁶⁹ In October 1931, İsmet İnönü paid in his turn a visit to Athens, and Turkish-Greek relations continued to be amicable throughout 1931-1932.

In addition to these top-level political initiatives, the senior government officials of both states were preoccupied with the common Greek-Turkish cultural basis and the pretty much same origins of the two peoples.²⁷⁰ Their purpose was not to merely underline the coinciding interests that would be safeguarded by a Turkish-Greek political union, but to stress the inevitability of such unification by virtue of the common civilizational background and the kinship between the two nations.²⁷¹ On 20 December 1930, during his briefing to the Greek MPs about the negotiations in Athens that had produced the three Greek-Turkish agreements of 30 October 1930, Venizelos stated in the Greek parliament: “It was verified [during the

²⁶⁵ On 17 June 1930, Venizelos put a definite end to any thought for the revival of the Great Idea. During the parliamentary discussion for the ratification of the convention, he declared: “Our historic struggle against Turkey, which lasted for centuries, should be considered as definitively terminated in the light of the the last war” [Stefanou (1969), p. 279. Cited in Kitsikis (1995a), p. 25].

²⁶⁶ Venizelos’s visit to Turkey resulted in the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship, Arbitration and Conciliation” on 30 October 1930.

²⁶⁷ Clark (2006), p. 201.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁹ ‘Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mustafa_Kemal_Ataturk#cite_ref-134.

²⁷⁰ Kitsikis (1995a), p. 28.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*

talks in Ankara] that the two peoples are racially closer to each other than it is commonly believed (...) the Turks claim and rightly believe that they are Aryans, having certainly a part of their blood coming from outside. They argue that the Cappadocians, the Skyths, the Assyrians and other races always existed in Asia Minor. We, the Greeks, went there and hellinized them, so they became for long centuries Greeks. Then, the Turks arrived and turkified them. But these populations remained the same, despite the fact that some of their blood comes from outside”.²⁷² On one trip of him to Turkey, the Venizelist MP Leon Makkas sent to Venizelos a report of a lengthy discussion that he had with Atatürk on 6 May 1931 in Ankara. There Makkas noted: “Mustafa Kemal turned the conversation to an apparently endearing theory to him on the common origin of the Greeks and the Turks. He accordingly emphasized to me his pleasure for the upholding of this theory by the Greek Mr. Moschopoulos, and asked me to send to him as soon as possible the full text of the relevant lecture given by Mr. Moschopoulos in Athens”.²⁷³

So, was the post-1928 shift of Venizelos solely aiming at establishing friendly relations between Turkey and Greece? For Kitsikis, it was much more than that: a sincere wish to form an actual Turkish-Greek confederation.²⁷⁴ In his 1933 electoral campaign, Venizelos declared: “Maybe someday we will constitute one state together. As Tevfik Rüştü Aras told me, the only thing that divides us is Maritza river. Maybe one day it will divide us just in terms of administration”.²⁷⁵ To substantiate his argument, Kitsikis cites an incident that occurred in a meeting of the Committee of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10 May 1933. At this session that had as a subject matter the preparation of a ten-year Greek-Turkish Treaty of

²⁷² *Ibid*, pp. 28-29; *Supra*, note 91. For Kitsikis’s assessment on the racial origins of the Turks and the misguided identification of the Ural-Altai language with the Ural-Altai race, see Kitsikis (2003), pp. 90-93.

²⁷³ Kitsikis (January-March 1969), p. 119-120; Kitsikis (1995a), p. 27. Nikephoros Moschopoulos (1871-1964) was a Greek journalist and scholar born in Istanbul.

²⁷⁴ Kitsikis (1995a), p. 25.

²⁷⁵ Cited in Ünal (1986), p. 1994.

Guarantees,²⁷⁶ Venizelos (who had in between passed to the opposition) came forward as a prophet of the Greek-Turkish state, repeating thrice in the course of the discussion that Greece and Turkey will jointly built a future federation. The pertinent phrases of Venizelos were: “One day will come when we will create with Turkey an Eastern Federation”; “you will see that, in twenty years, we and Turkey will manage to establish an Eastern Federation”; and, “with the signing of this treaty, which I consider fortunate, we will proceed even further and you will see that in the course of the years we will reach the point to make with Turkey the Eastern Federation”.²⁷⁷ Hence, Venizelos was espousing and vindicating *ex-post* the hellenoturkic Eastern Ideal of his chief ideological opponent, Dragoumis, affirming that history has its own sense of justice.

On the other pole, there are more subtle evidences on whether Atatürk was sharing the same federalist vision. On 28 October 1930, during the Turkish-Greek negotiations that resulted in the conclusion of the “Treaty of Friendship, Arbitration and Conciliation” of 30 October 1930, Atatürk proclaimed that “from now on, Greece’s borders should be admitted as Turkey’s”.²⁷⁸ Certainly, construing such a weighty statement as an unequivocal unionist disposition, a verbal manifestation of a robust alliance, or a mere bombast, is a difficult deductive enterprise. According to Kitsikis, the idea of a Greek-Turkish federation that would revive Byzantium was equally -if not mostly- an idea of Atatürk.²⁷⁹ To support this claim, he quotes an excerpt from the memoirs of Makkas that refers to his 1931 meetings with Atatürk. Makkas writes: “Kemal was the apostle (...) of a large Greek-Turkish Empire in the East, a double-headed empire with two administrative capitals and one cultural capital, the Augustian

²⁷⁶ It was signed in Ankara on 14 September 1933. See *infra*, note 287.

²⁷⁷ *Πρακτικά Συνσκέψεως τῆς Μεγάλῆς Ἐπιτροπῆς τοῦ Ὑπουργείου Ἐξωτερικῶν τῆς 10ῆς Μαΐου 1933* [Minutes of the Meeting of the Grand Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10 May 1933], Athens, 1933. Cited in Kitsikis (January-March 1969), p. 119 and Kitsikis (1995a), p. 26. According to Kitsikis, by saying “federation” Venizelos was implying in fact a confederation of two sovereign states in the modern sense [Kitsikis (1995a), pp. 25-26].

²⁷⁸ Cited in Ünal (1986), p. 1987.

²⁷⁹ Kitsikis (1995a), p. 27.

city which was successively called Buzantium, Constantinople, Istanbul and which will always remain, by its very geographical position, the Queen City of the entire Eastern world (...) I did not have before me the Peter the Great of Turkey anymore, but rather another Victor Hugo chanting his *Orientales*".²⁸⁰ A more indirect hint of Atatürk's feelings can be found in one of his letters to the Greek Finance Minister Georgios Pesmatzoglou, at the time that the latter was in Ankara for economic negotiations. Atatürk wrote in an unusually emotional tone: "I learn that the honorable representatives of the two nations that love each other and convert darkness into a bright world, the fraternal Greeks and Turks, are gathered together this evening (...) There is no doubt that the day is coming - as the Turkish-Greek friendship strengthens - that we will see a bright horizon glowing and dazzling the eyes of the World. We, the Turkish people, have forever given our love [to you], and even if we are the victims of such a love, we shall still feel happy".²⁸¹

To evaluate the substance and the sincerity of the intentions of the two men, a brief analysis of the international matrix in which the Greek-Turkish rapprochement was concluded is due. It was an era when the frenzied regional antagonisms of the great powers in the Balkans had gripped every state of the region in a dangerous power game, which perplexed further the inter-Balkan relations.²⁸² The position of Kemalist Turkey in the post-WWI world was a "neutralist attitude in modern sense",²⁸³ embodied in the maxim "peace at home, peace at the world". In the early 1930s, changes and developments in world politics required the country to make multilateral agreements in order to improve its security, pursuing a foreign policy

²⁸⁰ Maccas (1938). Cited in Kitsikis (1995a), p. 27.

²⁸¹ Letter of 5 November 1934. Cited in Pesmatzoglou (1980), pp. 179-182; Kitsikis (January-March 1969), p. 119; Kitsikis (1995a), pp. 26-27.

²⁸² In the first half of the 1930s, France and Italy were the two main competitors over the Balkans. After 1935, Great Britain and Germany came to the fore, due to the decrease of the French influence and the augmentation of the German power that put Italy aside [Kitsikis (1995a), p. 32].

²⁸³ Zimova (1986), p. 2000.

that was operating in a peaceful-cooperative manner.²⁸⁴ By that time, Turkey had already concluded joint friendship and neutrality agreements with the western powers.²⁸⁵ Atatürk's neutralist nationalism, aiming at regional security and peace, intrigued Venizelos.²⁸⁶ After renouncing his instrumentalization as a lackey of the western imperialism (and particularly as a proxy of Great Britain), the Greek politician was now determined to detach his country from the great powers. The two leaders saw in each other a frank and trustworthy ally in their common mission. Although they both encouraged Balkanism and the forging of a broader alliance with the other Balkan states in order to counter more effectively the western pressures, their utmost concern was the Greek-Turkish partnership.²⁸⁷

The non-alignment efforts of Venizelos lasted less than five years, as after his 1932 electoral defeat Greece returned consecutively under the French and British spheres of influence.²⁸⁸ Even today, the reconciliation with Turkey is considered as the greatest foreign policy achievement of his last term as Prime Minister. After his fall from power, Greek-Turkish relations proceeded undisturbed until the outbreak of the Cyprus problem in the mid-1950s. In September 1933, Venizelos' s successor Panagis Tsaldaris visited Turkey and signed the Entente Cordiale,²⁸⁹ a stepping-stone for the Balkan Pact that came to being in 1934.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁴ Kitsikis traces in this “equalitarian nationalism” of Atatürk during the Interwar period the origins of neutralism which appeared in the aftermath of WWII [Kitsikis (1971), p. 26]. On the problem of neutralism in the Balkans in 1930s, see Kitsikis (July-September 1967).

²⁸⁵ Indicatively, Turkey had attended many international meetings under the aegis of the League of Nations relating to disarmament and peacemaking, even before becoming a member of the league in 1932.

²⁸⁶ Kitsikis (1995a), pp. 21, 34. As Venizelos himself stated, Atatürk's project was aiming at preserving peace and establishing sustainable cooperation by maintaining the status quo.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

²⁸⁹ Entente Cordiale, 14 September 1933. Under the terms of this agreement, Greece and Turkey mutually guaranteed their common frontier in Thrace, agreed to consult each other on all international questions of common interest and expressed their mutual readiness to rely upon the delegate of either state in all international meetings with limited representation [Türkeş (1994), p. 130]. Article 3 read as follows: “In all international meetings the membership of which is restricted, Greece and Turkey are prepared to consider that it will be the duty of the representative of one of the two parties to defend the common and special interests of both parties; and they undertake to endeavour to secure such joint representation, either alternatively or in particular cases of special importance, by the country most closely concerned” [cited in Hodge (1950), p. 94].

²⁹⁰ The Balkan Pact was signed by Greece, Turkey, Romania and Yugoslavia (i.e. the countries consisting the so-called Balkan Entente) on 9 February 1934 in Athens, becoming effective on the same day and lasting until 1940. It foresaw the approaching WWI and aimed at being a balancing factor between European blocs that were

Nonetheless, if the friendship with Turkey remained, this was because it served the regional interests of England (and later the United States), and not because it was the product of an independent policy.²⁹¹

During 1928-1933, hellenoturkism was for the first time contrived in an egalitarian basis and without anti-slavic underpinnings.²⁹² This had to do with the new reality; the empire that included the two peoples - and within which the Greeks had first tried to attain parity and then preeminence- no longer existed.²⁹³ In its position there were now two sovereign nation-states, which were sharing its old center and separating by borders the two brotherly nations.²⁹⁴ As Kitsikis holds, the post-1923 revival of hellenoturkism was dictated by the need to close the wound that had been opened by the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.²⁹⁵ Furthermore, it became possible due to the balance of power that had been attained between the two countries.²⁹⁶ In realpolitik terms, the 1928 unitarian trend in the two sides of the Aegean was not of economic texture, as the two economies were not complementary.²⁹⁷ It was a much more serious ambition, a vital impulse burst forward by two nationalisms that sought to restore the unity of the Intermediate Region, so that this large ensemble could multiply the

competing over the Balkans. Essentially, it was mutual-defence agreement intended to guarantee the signatories' territorial integrity and political independence against attack by another Balkan (state such as Bulgaria or Albania) and to counter the increasingly aggressive foreign policy of fascist Italy and a potential Bulgarian alignment with Nazi Germany. According to Zimova, the rationale of the Balkan unity "was not to constitute an aggressive bloc or a factitious and precacious alliance of the governments, but an intimate union of the nations, seeking only their safety and prosperity in a mutual understanding" [Zimova (1986), p. 2000]. However, it failed to stem substantial regional intrigue and fulfill the purposes it was concluded for. For the aggravating developments in the Balkans from 1936 to 1940, see Kitsikis (1995a), pp. 67-84].

²⁹¹ Kitsikis (1995a), p. 34.

²⁹² *Ibid*, p. 17.

²⁹³ *Ibid*.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid*.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 21.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 9. Kitsikis observes: "The two states were equally robust. For the Turks, the decline in the East had stopped, whereas the Greek rise in the West had also ceased (...) Due to the organization of these two nation-states, after 1923 there had been a balance of force between the two shores of the Aegean (...) in 1928 [Greece] had a territory of 129.281 km² and 6.204.864 inhabitants (...) [while] Turkey had -according to the census of 1927- 13.711.000 inhabitants and a territory of 772.340 km² (...) If in terms of population and territorial extent Turkey excelled of Greece, the balance between the two countries was restored by the superiority of Greece's in economic, cultural and social and national homogeneity terms" [*Ibid*, pp. 17-19].

²⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 19.

strength of the two peoples.²⁹⁸ The pursuit of power by two weak nations in order to entrench their independence, in a period of inveterate competitions among the European and regional powers in the Balkans and the Near East, was the only pragmatic incentive behind these unifying efforts.²⁹⁹

2.2.4. The fourth countenance of hellenoturkism (1968-1973)

2.2.4.1. The hellenoturkic manifestations of the military juntas in Greece and Turkey

After an interval of fifty years, hellenoturkism came again to the fore. In the meantime, a 25-year period of friendly relations that was inaugurated by Venizelos and Atatürk had been interrupted by the nationalist resurgence sparked by the Cyprus issue around the mid-1950s. On 28 June 1968, the leader of the Greek junta that had assumed power after the 21 April 1967 military coup, Georgios Papadopoulos, stated in an interview to *Milliyet*: “The voices of Atatürk and Venizelos are still heard (...) we must unite the two shores of the Aegean”.³⁰⁰ When the Turkish journalist (and son-in-law of Ismet Inonou), Metin Toker, asked him if he was implying the creation of a Turkish-Greek federation, Papadopoulos replied in the spirit of Venizelos: “I want to stress my belief in the necessity of making this federation (...) If I had magical powers I would do everything for the realization of this federation and I would forthwith lead our people to this direction”.³⁰¹ Throughout 1969 and 1970, Papadopoulos made a great effort to develop the Greek-Turkish friendship, but had to wait for the 1971 Turkish coup d'état in order to find a sympathetic ear in the altera pars.³⁰²

During a press conference in Athens on 25 May 1971 after he had met with Papadopoulos, Toker expressed his belief that the Greek PM wished sincerely the Turkish-Greek friendship

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁰ Cited in Kitsikis (1995a), p. 305.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*

³⁰² *Ibid.*

and forwarded to Papadopoulos the respective sentiments of the Turkish PM Nihat Erim.³⁰³ Four days later, Toker published in *Milliyet* statements that Papadopoulos had made to him during his visit in Athens. Papadopoulos said: “I personally believe that history leads us to a federation of Turkey with Greece. It will may take place in 20 or 50 years, but it will take place. We must accept the fact that we are small countries. If we have the union, then our power vis-a-vis the big countries will not only double, but it will be multiplied”.³⁰⁴ As for the Cyprus question, Papadopoulos opined that the solution was not a necessary precondition, because otherwise there was the danger “to miss the horseshoe for the nail”.³⁰⁵ That is, Papadopoulos reiterated with the same stentorian certitude the phrase of Venizelos of 10 May 1933 “one day we will make an Eastern federation”. As Kitsikis observes, the belief of both leaders that “the Greek-Turkish federation is a historical necessity, that history has a certain direction that will end sooner or later in the union of the two countries” is in itself remarkable.³⁰⁶

On 25 June 1971, Erim responded publicly to his Greek counterpart, by stating in an interview to the Athens News Agency that his government was also favoring a Greek-Turkish (con)federation.³⁰⁷ After reiterating his will and wish for the improvement and enhancement of the Turkish-Greek bilateral relations between the two countries, and uttering his conviction that Turkey was a “natural ally” of Greece, Erim said: “I have always stressed that Cyprus could become a specific prototype of the ideals and Atatürk and Venizelos, i.e. for the establishment one day of some form of federation between Turkey and Greece (...) I have always contended that in the international arena Turkey plus Greece equals not two but ten, twenty, thirty, because with that cooperation the potentials of two countries are increased not

³⁰³ *Ibid*, pp. 305-306.

³⁰⁴ Cited in Kitsikis (1995a), p. 306.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid*.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 306-307.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 309.

numerically but geometrically (...) Mr. Papadopoulos' personality inspires confidence in me".³⁰⁸ The Turkish PM added: "I was sometimes advised: let's put aside the Cyprus issue and try to improve the relations between Turkey and Greece (...) [But] in 1963, serious events took place in Cyprus. Blood was shed. Innocent blood. As a result, a Turkish leader can do nothing without any previous development in Cyprus that allows oblivion".³⁰⁹ That is, Turkey was agreeing with Greece on the target (i.e. the union of the two peoples), but was insisting on a prior settlement of the Cyprus issue.³¹⁰ The Turkish leadership was trusting the Greek government to find a solution (something that was attested by all foreign observers at that time), especially since Turkey was stagnating in a severe internal crisis that incapacitated the projection of a long range foreign policy on its part.³¹¹

The period 1971-1972 was fraught with intense efforts of political, intellectual and religious representatives for the promotion of the Turkish-Greek partnership.³¹² The Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras was one of the most ardent hellenoturkists. His biographer, Dimitrios Tsakonas, writes: "He believed sincerely in a Greek-Turkish union and friendship (...) in order to make Greece and Turkey 'masters of their own house' [meaning fully sovereign] (...) [he was] anti-nationalist and federalist –for that, a neo-Phanariot- [and] he was foreseeing that a Greek-Turkish union will be the first phase of a broader federal structure that would include neighboring peoples".³¹³ Within Greece, Georgios Georgalas (Minister attached to the Prime Minister and first Government Spokesperson, 1970-1973) was also espousing the hellenoturkic ideas.³¹⁴ In the diplomatic circles, Panagiotis Pipinelis (Minister of Foreign

³⁰⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 309-310.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid*, p. 310.

³¹⁰ *Ibid*.

³¹¹ *Ibid*.

³¹² *Ibid*, p. 311.

³¹³ Tsakonas (1976), pp. 62-63. Cited in Kitsikis (1995a), p. 312. For the relevant activities of Athenagoras, see Alexandris (1978), pp. 375-384.

³¹⁴ Later on, in his 1979 manifesto, Georgalas wrote: "We sincerely believe in the necessity of the Greek-Turkish cooperation. The cooperation between the two countries might develop steadily for their mutual benefit and lead gradually to a kind of Common Market between them, with a view to setting up in stages a Greek-Turkish

Affairs, 1967-1970), Christos Xanthopoulos-Palamas (Deputy Minister, Alternate Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1970-1973), and Spyridon Markezinis (Prime Minister, October-November 1973) had also displayed hellenoturkic tendencies.³¹⁵ Indicatively, after he was appointed Prime Minister by Papadopoulos (who had in the meanwhile become President of the Republic) in 1973, Markezinis imposed an absolute ban on anti-Turkish propaganda to the Greek press.³¹⁶

On 25 November 1973, Markezinis and Papadopoulos were toppled by the extreme anti-Turkish Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannidis. As we learn from Kitsikis, after the recent discovery of oil in the Aegean, Ioannidis believed that Greece could become a major power not hesitating to declare war against Turkey.³¹⁷ He subsequently orchestrated and executed the 15 July 1974 coup in Cyprus, that annihilated every thought for a (con)federacy between the two countries.³¹⁸ As the 1974 Turkish intervention that followed the Cypriot coup d'état clearly showed, Cyprus constituted for 20 years the main hindrance impeding a partnership between the two countries. More specifically, the main reason for this failure was the collapse of the Turkish military regime of 1960-1961 and the respective Greek of 1967-1973, which had tried to resolve the Cyprus problem.³¹⁹

Confederation. This policy is not a romanticism, or a preposterous daydreaming, but a courageous approach to reality and truly realistic" [Georgalas (1979), pp. 60-61].

³¹⁵ Kitsikis (1995a), p. 312.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 313.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 313-314.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.* Kitsikis considers Makarios culpable for the Cypriot tragedy, mainly due to his refusal to implement the 1959 London-Zurich agreements. See, for example, 'Yunanlı Prof. Kitsikis: "Kıbrıs bunalımının sorumlusu Makarios'tur"', *Milliyet*, 20 December 1981; 'Tek yol Dostluk!', *Milliyet*, 22 December 1981; 'Türk-Yunan ilişkileri ve Kıbrıs', *Cumhuriyet*, 15 February 1982.

2.2.5. The current expression of hellenoturkism under Kitsikis

Undoubtedly, the leading present-day figure of hellenoturkism is the Greek historian and turcologist Dimitri Kitsikis.³²⁰ Placed in the vanguard of the modern Greek Eastern Party, Kitsikis revitalized and conceptualized the hellenoturkic ideal of his predecessors in his numerous books, articles and papers, as well as with his multifarious activity in both Greece and Turkey from the mid-1960s onwards. In doing so, he attached an explicit ideological meaning to it for the first time in its evolutonal course. It can be unexagerrately said that Kitsikis is the impersonification of hellenoturkism today, having delineated in his prolific writings the contemporary content and goals of the hellenoturkic ideology.³²¹

³²⁰ Kitsikis holds also the French and Canadian citizenships. He is thus a Panhellen (a cosmopolitan Greek), with the idea of a global Hellenism dominating his works and his teaching. ‘Dimitri Kitsikis’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimitri_Kitsikis; See also Kitsikis, (January 2000).

³²¹ This part will focus on the discursive development of hellenoturkism under Kitsikis. However, it is worth mentioning briefly his various efforts and political activism for the communication and promotion of hellenoturkic ideology [e.g. see ‘Yunanistanlı profesör Kitsikis “Türkiye ile Yunanistan kader birliği yapmalı” dedi’, *Hürriyet*, 31 August 1978; ‘Prof. Kitsikis: Türkiye, Yunanistan’la konfederasyon kurmalı’, *Milliyet*, 1 September 1978; ‘Yunanlı tarihçi Kitsikis: Rusya bütün dünyayı tehdit eden bir emperyalisttir; Bizlerin yeri Üçüncü Dünya’dır diyen’, *Aydınlık*, 1 September 1978; ‘Türkiye ile Yunanistan’ ın biraraya gelerek konfederasyon kurlmaları gerekir’, *Günaydın*, 1 September 1978; ‘Yunanlı Prof. Kitsikis: Türk-Yunan işbirliği tarihi bir gerekliliktir’, *Cumhuriyet*, 20 December 1981; “Tek yol Dostluk!”, *Milliyet*, 22 December 1981; ‘Türk-Yunan ilişkileri ve Kıbrıs’, *Cumhuriyet*, 15 February 1982; ‘Türk-Yunan Dostluğuyla Ege sentezi’, *Cumhuriyet*, 29 July 1988; ‘Türkiye ile Yunanistan konfederasyon kurmalı’, *Türkiye*, 13 July 1990]. Kitsikis has inspired the idea of the Greek-Turkish confederation to statesmen, politicians, journalists, artists and thinkers in both Greece and Turkey. He was a close friend and advisor of Prime Ministers Konstantinos Karamanlis and Turgut Özal [See ‘Dimitri Kitsikis’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimitri_Kitsikis]. In 1975 he visited Ankara as an informal envoy of the Greek government and had contacts with the leaderships of the Turkish political parties (MHP’s leader and vice-president of the Turkish government, Alparslan Türkeş, CHP’s leaders Deniz Baykal and Haluk Ülman, DP’ leader Ferruh Bozbeyle and AP’s vice-president Sabit Osman Avcı) and other officials (Turan Güneş, the former Turkish PM and then senator Nihat Erim, the general director of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation Nevzat Yalçıntaş) on the issue of Cyprus and the Turkish-Greek relations, while previously he had visited for the same purpose the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş in Nicosia [“Bir Yunanlı profesör, Ankara’da Türk-Yunan ilişkilerini inceliyor», *Milliyet*, 18 July 1975, p. 10]. In the period 1990-1992, he was an adviser of the Turkish President Özal, propaganding publicly his ideas and influencing the latter to a certain extent [e.g. see ‘Özal’ın Yunanlı konuğu’, *Tan*, 28 June 1990; ‘Yunan profesör: “Özal gibi Cumhurbaşkanı görmedim”’, *Hürriyet*, 28 June 1990; ‘Özal: Seçtiklerinizi çekeceksiniz’, *Cumhuriyet*, 28 June 1990; ‘Özal: 7 yılda, 3 dev proje gerçekleşti’, *Türkiye*, 28 June 1990; ‘Özal’ın yeni dostu’, *Milliyet*, 29 June 1990; ‘Βιογράφος του Οζάλ!’, *Εθνος*, 29 June 1990; ‘Özal Marmaris’te’, *Türkiye*, 1 July 1990; ‘Özal’ın sarayına kuş uçurtulmuyor’, *Yeni Asır*, 1 July 1990; ‘Την Παρασκευή η συνάντηση Μητσοτάκη-Ακμπουλούτ’, *Bema*, 1 July 1990; ‘Özal’ın “Mahrem” tatili’, *Hürriyet*, 2 July 1990; ‘Özal yatla gezdi’, *Tercüman*, 2 July 1990; ‘Yunanlı solcu Özal için kitap yazıyor!’, *Sabah*, 12 July 1990; ‘Kucaktan inmek’, *Sabah*, 15 July 1990; ‘Özal kitabının yazarı Bilkent’te’, *Hürriyet*, 15 July 1990; Alexandrou, G., ‘Ελληνοτουρκική Όμοσπονδία: Τα άπόκρυφα σχέδια τοῦ Τουργκούτ Οζάλ’ [Greek-Turkish Federation: The secret projects of Turgut Özal], *Greek Forum*, vol. 17, no.9/195, pp. 60-63 (October 1990)]. In 1992, Kitsikis was awarded the Abdi İpekci Friendship and Peace Prize for his poetry collection *l’Orocc dans l’âge de Kali*

2.2.5.1 Kitsikis as the leading contemporary theoretician of hellenoturkism

Born in 1935 in Athens, Kitsikis spent his entire academic career in the study of the Turkish-Greek relations as a researcher in several scientific centers and a professor of international relations and geopolitics at the University of Ottawa since 1970.³²² At a very early point, he sensed the need for a new paradigm on his subject matter, making the establishment of a Greek-Turkish state his *idée fixe* and life's calling. In 1978 he gave an account of his revelation: "After years of study I realized that the Greek and the Turk need a psychoanalyst.³²³ They had lived together for nine hundred years and when their common state, the Ottoman Empire, collapsed, they found themselves orphaned with the wound of that separation, without understanding that their mental imbalance derives from the fact that they had lost their other half. To rediscover themselves and recover from the malady of West-imported nationalism they had to come up with a novel scheme that would replace the deceased Ottoman Empire; and this new scheme was the Greek-Turkish confederation".³²⁴

In the following years, Kitsikis fabricated a comprehensive analytical framework for the explanation of the longstanding realities of the Greek-Turkish space. This framework comprised four concepts: i) the "Intermediate Region" (*Ενδιάμεση Περιοχή*) of civilisation between the Euro-American West and the Hindu-Chinese East; ii) the "Eastern Party" (*Ανατολική Παράταξις*) and the "Western Party" (*Δυτική Παράταξις*) in Greece and Turkey, as

[Kitsikis, D. (1985), *l'Orocc dans l'âge de Kali*, Naaman, Sherbrooke (Québec)]. In 1996, the Turkish PM Mesut Yılmaz praised Kitsikis's best seller book in Turkey *Türk-Yunan İmparatorluğu. Arabölge gerçeği ışığında Osmanlı Tarihine bakış* (İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1996) ['Yeni Kitsikislerin ortaya çıkmasını istiyorum', *Nokta*, 31 March- 6 April 1996, p. 45]. Since autumn 1996, Kitsikis issues the quarterly journal *Ενδιάμεση Περιοχή* (Intermediate Region) and contributes regularly to Greek magazines, where he constantly promulgates the hellenoturkic ideas. Finally, since May 2012 he voices his pertinent opinions in his personal blog 'Endiamese Perioche', which is also named after his geopolitical model [<http://endiameseperioche.blogspot.de>].

³²² 'Dimitri Kitsikis', Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimitri_Kitsikis. For a brief biographical note, see 'Dimitri Kitsikis Foundation', <http://www.idkf.gr>.

³²³ Kitsikis had previously explained the function of historians as psychoanalysts of nations in his 1971 seminal piece *Le Nationalisme* [Kitsikis (1971), pp. 352-353].

³²⁴ Kitsikis (1998), pp. 20-21. Kitsikis adds: "I had even designed since 1970 the emblem of the future confederation: A crescent entangled with a cross, on a background combining the Greek blue and the Turkish red" [*Ibid*].

an antagonistic couple; iii) “Hellenoturkism” (*Ελληνοτουρκισμός*), as an ideology and a cultural phenomenon of the last one thousand years; and, iv) the Bektashi-Alevi religious origin of the Ottoman dynasty, the Islamization of which developed hand-in-hand with its secularisation and westernisation.³²⁵

The most salient elements of today’s hellenoturkism are found in Kitsikis’s books, which are all permeated by the hellenoturkic ideal.³²⁶ In 1977 Kitsikis dedicated his book *Ελλάς και ξένοι, 1919-1967* (“Greece and the Foreigners, 1919-1967”) “to Çamlıca”,³²⁷ while one year later he wrote in the coverpage of his book *Συγκριτική Ιστορία Ελλάδος και Τουρκίας στον 20ό αιώνα* (“Comparative history of Greece and Turkey in the 20th century”) the enigmatic phrase “the road to Çamlıca”.³²⁸ There he narrates: “At the beginning of 1970, I climbed the hill of Çamlıca on the Asian shore of the Bosphorus, a place that was symbolizing love in the Ottoman tradition. In the grave column of the veli [saint], I made the gesture that all lovers that climb up that hill do: I made a wish and threw a coin. If the coin sticks in this vertical and smooth column, the wish comes true. My coin stuck at once and my wish was “the Greek-Turkish Confederation to be realized one day - no matter how distant; and when this would happen, then [me] to be buried next to the veli”.³²⁹ In September 1978, the Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet* invited Kitsikis to present the aforementioned book to the Turkish press. On this occasion, the newspaper published a lengthy article of him entitled “Çamlıca Hayali”

³²⁵ ‘Dimitri Kitsikis’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimitri_Kitsikis.

³²⁶ Inescapably, this gleaning does not include a plethora of articles, speeches and interviews. For an full overview of Kitsikis’s bibliography and some public talks of him, see ‘Dimitri Kitsikis Foundation’, <http://www.idkf.gr>.

³²⁷ Kitsikis (1977), preface.

³²⁸ Kitsikis (1978).

³²⁹ Kitsikis (1998), pp. 21-22; Kitsikis, “Türk-Yunan dostluğu için dilek havuzuna para altı”, *Hürriyet*, 1 September 1978.

(The Dream of Çamlıca), where he exposed to the wider Turkish public his grandiose vision for the Greek-Turkish confederation.³³⁰

In 1981 Kitsikis published his work *Ιστορία τοῦ ἑλληνοτουρκικοῦ χώρου, 1928-1973* (History of the Greek-Turkish space, 1928-1973), the sequel of his 1978 comparative historical treatise on the two countries.³³¹ However, his international breakthrough occurred in 1985, with the publishing of his book *L'Empire Ottoman*.³³² There, Kitsikis elaborated on the fundamentals of the pre-modern Turkish-Greek history, shedding light on the hellenoturkic civilizational phenomenon. The central idea of this milestone book was that the Ottoman era was not a period of “400 years of slavery” for the Greeks (as it had been portrayed by then in the Greek historiography), but instead a “splendid edifice of world history” in which the Greek spirit contributed decisively and of which the Greeks should feel proud.³³³ He thereupon reproduced one of the basic leitmotifs of the Greek Easternists, according to which the Ottoman domination saved Eastern Greek civilization from its absorption by the Saxon-Latin world.³³⁴ Going further than that, Kitsikis asserted that the Ottoman Empire was for centuries the cultural and political expression of Hellenism, condemning Greek nationalism for

³³⁰ “Çamlıca Hayali”, *Hürriyet*, 2 September 1978; Kitsikis (1998), p. 22. Kitsikis has frequently suggested Istanbul and, more specifically, Çamlıca to be the federal capital of his proposed Greek-Turkish confederation [e.g. see ‘Türk-Yunan Federasyonu (?)’, *Tercüman*, 20 November 1981; ‘Türk-Yunan Dostluğuyla Ege sentezi’, *Cumhuriyet*, 29 July 1988].

³³¹ Kitsikis (1995a).

³³² Kitsikis (1985). The book was published in the same year in Greek [Kitsikis, *Ιστορία τῆς Ὀθωμανικῆς Ἀυτοκρατορίας, 1280-1924*, 1st edition, Athens, Hestia (1985)], and in 1996 in Turkish [Kitsikis, *Türk-Yunan İmparatorluğu. Arabölge gerçeği ışığında Osmanlı Tarihine bakış*, Istanbul, İletişim Yayınları (1996)]. It was later translated in many other languages, e.g. Spanish [Kitsikis, *El Imperio otomano*, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica (1989)], Portuguese [Kitsikis, *O Império otomano*, Porto, Rés Editora (1996)], as well as in Serbian, Bulgarian and Russian.

³³³ Kitsikis (2003), p. 25. As he notes, “in the uninterrupted flow of Greek history from the antiquity to the present, the Ottoman period is among the most brilliant” [*Ibid*, p. 119].

³³⁴ For example, see *ibid*, p. 48; Kitsikis (1998), pp. 37, 40. Kitsikis anti-Westernism contains within it a profound anti-Catholicism and anti-Protestantism reflected in his frequent aphorisms to the West throughout his writings. Primarily, he holds western powers responsible for dissembling this totality of the Intermediate Region and fomenting the Turkish-Greek enmity. For some exemplary statements of him in the press, see ‘Yunanlı tarih profesörü Türk-Yunan anlaşmazlığı için batı dünyasını suçladı’, *Tercüman*, 1 September 1978; ‘Kitsikis’, *Hürriyet*, 1 September 1978; ‘Türkiye, Yunanistan’la konfederasyon kuralı», *Milliyet*, 1 September 1978; ‘Yunanlı tarihçi ‘Türklerle aramızı Batı açıyor’ dedi’, *Dünya*, 1 September 1978; ‘Prof. Kaynar: Torsenel Atatürkçülüğü bırakalım’, *Cumhuriyet*, 12 November 1981.

allowing Turks to arrogate the Ottoman legacy entirely to themselves.³³⁵ In restoration of this injustice, the book persuasively demonstrated an extensive Turkish-Greek collaboration in the administration of the Ottoman Empire, which essentially rendered the latter a Turkish-Greek *etat cooperatif*.

In 1990, 2001 and 2010 respectively, Kitsikis's books *Η τρίτη ιδεολογία και η Όρθοδοξία* (The third [political] ideology and Orthodoxy), *Τό Βυζαντινό πρότυπο διακυβέρνησεως και τό τέλος τοῦ κοινοβουλευτισμοῦ* (The Byzantine model of government and the end of parliamentarism) and *Ἐθνικομπολσεβικισμός, Πέραν τοῦ φασισμοῦ καί τοῦ κομμουνισμοῦ* (National-Bolshevism; Beyond fascism and communism) were published.³³⁶ There, the author spelled out his political and religious convictions. Like the vast majority of the hellenoturkists/members of the Greek Eastern Party before him, Kitsikis is a profound Orthodox Christian and his general outlook is gravely influenced by his religious beliefs.³³⁷ Politically, Kitsikis is averse towards the western parliamentary system (which he regards as foreign to the Greek tradition), and expresses admiration for the endemic Byzantine models of laocracy and “togetherness” at the top level (i.e. the close cooperation between the Supreme

³³⁵ Kitsikis (2003), back cover. Kitsikis stigmatized the position that prevailed in the 19th century Balkan and 20th century Arabic historiography that the Ottoman Empire was a Turkish state (mainly military, barbarian and non-creative) as an essential distortion of history. Similarly he criticized the identification of the Byzantine Empire as a Greek state by the western scholars. According to him, such modernist national characterizations of a pre-modern and by definition multi-ethnic structure like an empire constitute both linguistic abuses and sheer anachronisms [see Kitsikis (2003), pp. 19-29]. In another point he writes: “The Ottoman Empire was the empire of the Romans [Orthodox Greeks] and on the day that the schools in Greece will finally teach this truth instead of the myth of the “dark years of Turkocracy”, a glorious part of Greek history will regain its position in the consciousness of the Greeks, who by calling it now “our Empire” will eliminate once and for all the Frankish plan for the reduction of their stature” [*Ibid*, p. 87]. Notably, Kitsikis has repeatedly admonished for respective reforms in the educational systems of Greece and Turkey and especially for the modification of the school textbooks [see for example, *supra*, note 91].

³³⁶ Kitsikis (1990, 2001 and 2010).

³³⁷ Characteristically, in most biographical notes of Kitsikis included in his books it is mentioned that “his exclusive guide is Orthodoxy”. However, in his entry in the Wikipedia we read: “Although a member of the official Church of Greece, he always sympathised with the Old-Calendarist movement, the adherents of which reject the Church's use of the Gregorian (New) calendar and maintain a traditionalist attitude towards Christian life and worship [On this point, see also Kitsikis (1995b)] (...) he came to sympathise with the Turkish religion of Bektashism-Alevism and sought to ally it with Orthodoxy, in order to form a basis for a future political union between Athens and Ankara. Believing in the collaboration of religious communities, as in the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, he worked closely with Shia Muslims in Iran, Jews in Israel and Hindu vaishnavs in India” [‘Dimitri Kitsikis’, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimitri_Kitsikis].

political authority and the Church in the exercise of power, that was partly taken up by the Ottomans).³³⁸ In today's context, he is attracted by the political movement of National Bolshevism, which combines elements of radical nationalism (especially Russian) and Bolshevism.³³⁹

Notwithstanding his Marxist and anti-nationalist postures, Kitsikis feels an intellectual affinity to a particular stream of the nationalist ideology in which he specializes. In his 1971 study *Le Nationalism*, he distinguished between two forms of nationalism, i.e. a “chauvinistic nationalism” (which believes that the nation to which it belongs is superior to all other nations and coincides with xenophobia and racism) and an “equalitarian nationalism” (which proclaims the fraternal kinship of fully-grown and equally sovereign nations).³⁴⁰ While he repudiates the former, he recognizes a specific utility to the latter. He writes: “[T]he intellectuals who condemn nationalism fail to understand that to pass from divergency to convergency, all the nations of the world must first become adult for the very good of mankind. The present supra-nationalists are feeble both in courage and in spirit. An authentic supra-nationalist must absolutely proceed *via* nationalism (...) A people could certainly go beyond nationalism, but for its “mental health” and hence for its survival, it necessarily had to pass through nationalism, that is, through a conscious affirmation of itself”.³⁴¹ Accordingly, Kitsikis rests the feasibility of his own supra-nationalist plan vis-à-vis Greece and Turkey upon the concurrent prevalence of a Kemalist type of nationalism in both countries.³⁴²

³³⁸ Kitsikis (2001). See also Kitsikis (November 2000) and his posts against parliamentarianism in his personal blog ‘Endiamese Perioche’: <http://endiameseperioche.blogspot.de>.

³³⁹ See for example his respective treatise [Kitsikis (2010)] and posts in his personal blog ‘Endiamese Perioche’: <http://endiameseperioche.blogspot.de>.

³⁴⁰ Kitsikis (1971), pp. 359-365.

³⁴¹ Kitsikis (1971), pp. 348-349, 352-353.

³⁴² Kitsikis corroborated his conclusion empirically, during his 1975 visit in Turkey [see *supra*, note 319]. After his meetings with the leaders of the Turkish political parties, he contended that “there is no hope of mutual understanding with the liberal Turkish politicians, [but] there is with the Turkish nationalists! (...) Tūrkeş told me that our two nations, like two faces of one soul, must cooperate instead of trying to rise at the expense of the other (...) he claimed that “instead of being the ‘fifth wheel’ of the European community, [Turkey and Greece] should become the first wheel of the East” [Kitsikis, ‘Ελλάς και Τουρκία εις κρίσιμον καμπήν’, *Εστια*, 14 August 1975]. Kitsikis further noted that during his two-day meetings with the four vice-presidents of MHP at

The concluding part of his aforesaid study, entitled ‘From Equalitarian Nationalism to the Great Ensemble and the Universal Republic’, typifies Kitsikis’s enduring approach towards his proposed Greek-Turkish confederation and therefore it is useful to cite here some extensive extracts. Kitsikis notes: “[T]he road to power equality is perforce marked by conflicts. But wars between medium or small neighboring nations of equivalent strength can be avoided through the constitution of great ensembles in the interest of these very nations, because such ensembles would increase their power and therefore will offer them a better chance to attain equality of power on the international level (...) There is therefore but one solution for the small nation: the association within a great ensemble of neighboring nations of equivalent size – confederation, and later federation (...) In thus passing from divergence to convergence, one must be very careful that in laying down the federation as a goal one must not sacrifice the nations to this cause, since the federation should be but a means to assure the full development of the particular genius of each of its constituent nations (...) [The experiment of the European Economic Community] has taught us that to attempt such a union, the candidates must be nation-states of a very similar -in fact, practically equivalent- political, economic, cultural level and social structure”.³⁴³

Kitsikis continues: “Nationalists -just as internationalists- may wish to use federalism as a means towards the fulfillment of their goals, which just like neutralism is more a doctrine than an ideology. Internationalist federalists are supporters of supranationality, which to them must be applied as of the initial stages. They demand the maintenance of current federations and the constitution of new federations with an aim to weaken the nations. The internationalist federalists claim that they have not always been against nations, but that today the nation - or at least the nation-state - is an outmoded structure. The only thing is that, together with

the party’s headquarters, he observed “coinciding views as regards the willingness of the Greek and Turkish nationalists to cooperate “hand-in-hand” and away from the influence of the great powers in order to build together a strong Greece and a strong Turkey” [*Ibid*].

³⁴³ Kitsikis (1971), pp. 368-369.

Voltaire and Diderot, they have been saying the same thing since the 18th century, that is, since the beginning of nation-state building”.³⁴⁴

Finally, he epitomizes the approach with which he aligns himself: “Nationalist federalists, complying with historical reality, consider that the three following steps must be traversed [to reach supranationality]: a) the constitution of entirely independent nation-states, in order to safeguard the richness of human civilization (...) ; b) [subsequently] two or more nation-states that consider themselves close to each other group themselves into a confederation of equal nation-states, so as to increase their creative capacities and prevent the large states from subordinating them. This re-grouping of nation-states must be very carefully proceeded with, so as to ascertain the diversity of human civilization whose best guarantee are the nations; c) [finally] from the confederation of sovereign states we will move to a supranational federation and ultimately to a universal republic, but only after having attained effective equality among nations so that the universal republic may encompass the civilizing ingredients of all nations without forgetting a single one”.³⁴⁵

In 2006 Kitsikis published his book *Ἡ σημασία τοῦ μπεκτασισμοῦ-ἀλεβισμοῦ γιὰ τὸν ἐλληνισμό* (The importance of Bektashism-Alevism for Hellenism),³⁴⁶ where he holds that the Turkish-Greek confederation would be possible only if Alevism gains primacy within Turkey at the expense of Sunni Islam.³⁴⁷ He based his assumption on a variety of factors, namely the theological proximity of Alevism and Eastern Orthodoxy,³⁴⁸ the historical role of Alevism in

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 369.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁶ Kitsikis (2006).

³⁴⁷ Kitsikis is unequivocal on the ontological substance of Alevism as a distinct religion and opposes the perception of it as a mere philosophical manifestation of Islam. Accordingly, he caustically remarks that “the Sunni Turks tried to propagate the myth that Alevism is not a religion but just a philosophy” [Kitsikis (2006, p. 13)].

³⁴⁸ At page 9, Kitsikis asserts that “the theosis [deification] proposed by Alevism is inseparably linked to Hellenism and Orthodox Christianity. At another point he notes: “[It is important to highlight] the phenomenon of the Turkish-Greek composition of Alevism. The Turkish historians exaggerated the shamanic origins of this popular Turkish religion. Without denying [the existence] such an influence -as Alevism is by definition a result of the composition of shamanism, Shiism and Greek Orthodox Christianity- we should not neglect the enormous influence of the Greek-Orthodox Christianity and the Greek civilization of Asia Minor and the Balkans (before

the convergence between the Turks and the Greeks,³⁴⁹ and the linkages of this religion with Anatolian crypto-Christianity.³⁵⁰ Kitsikis regards Alevism/Bektashism as the authentic Turkish religion,³⁵¹ which today represents over a third of the total Turkish population (about 25 million people) concentrated in central and western Anatolia.³⁵² As he notes, although the Ottomans were originally Alevi, the progressive Sunnization of the Ottoman Empire -which was accelerated after 1512- resulted in the persecution of Alevism, as well as in the

the appearance of Christianity) over Alevism (...) The common pre-Christian origins of some traditions of both the popular Alevi faith and the Orthodox Christians, albeit being of some ethnological interest, are insubstantial from a theological point of view (...) Therefore, the shamanic origins of some of the features of Alevism, that were emphasized in order to prove the Turkishness of the Alevi faith, does in fact say nothing more than the dionysiac origins of some features of Christian Orthodoxy in Russia and Greece that come from the popular tradition" [*Ibid.*, pp. 17-18; see also Kitsikis (2003), pp. 103-104]. "The approach between Orthodox Christianity and Islam through Alevism was attempted by all these Greek trustees of Mehmet II in the 15th century [e.g. Zaganos, Evrenos, George of Trebizond, Amiroutzes, Gennadius] (...) thus, when a Greek Orthodox was becoming Bektashi through the devshirme, he was not having the feeling that he was changing religion and, in any case, he knew that he had not converted into a Muslim (...) therefore, the was not Islamization of the Balkans but rather Alevization" [Kitsikis (2006), p. 40; see also Kitsikis (2003), pp. 103-105].

³⁴⁹ Kitsikis writes summarily: "The future of the Greek-Turkish space depends on the Alevi. Why; Because they are the link between the Greeks and the Turks. Thanks to Bektashism, the jannisarism that consolidated the Ottoman dominance in the Intermediate Region remained in the hands of the Greeks ["Ῥωμαῖοί", Romans]. Thanks to the close relationship between Alevism and masonry in the 19th century, the project for a Greek-Turkish confederation was promoted [Kitsikis (2006), p. 9; See also, *surpa* (2.1.2)].

³⁵⁰ Given that a significant number [of Anatolian population] was proselytized to Islam, the Turkish people today are partly of Greek origin and more generally of Christian-Orthodox origin, whereas the opposite can not be argued for the Greek people, as the Christian proselytizing was not allowed" (...) [Also during the population exchange of 1923] it is difficult to estimate how many were those that converted voluntarily to Islam in order to escape the exchange" [*Ibid.*; see also Kitsikis (2003), pp. 190-193, 270]. For a meticulous study on the issue of crypto-Christians in Turkey, see Fragkos (2012)].

³⁵¹ "Alevism, as heterodox Islam, is in full contradistinction with Orthodox Sunni Islam, differing also substantially from the other main strand of Islam, i.e. Shiism. The main representative of Sunnism is the Arabs and the main representative of Shiism is Iran. Alevism also differs from the religious group of Allawi in Syria. [Alevism] is inextricably linked to the Turkish people in Asia Minor (...) Whilst the authentic religion of the Arabs is Sunni Islam and of the Iranians Shia Islam, both Semitic religions- the Alevi religion is Indo-European, something that was very much acclaimed by Atatürk who despised the Arabs and Islam. This explains the commitment of Alevi to Kemalism (...) and their hostility against any type of Islam, be it Saudi-Sunni or Iranian-Shiite Khamenei [type]. It is also explaining why the military-laïcité regime in Turkey favored Alevi against the Islamists after 1990 in its fight against Islamism, albeit their traditionally left, socialist and even communist positions" [Kitsikis (2006), pp. 12, 69]. See also Kitsikis, 'Η σημασία του τουρκικού Αλεβιτισμού για την Ελλάδα', *Kathimerini*, 31 March 1996, p. 16; 'Türkler'in dini Alevilik'ti!', *Aktüel*, no. 396, 18-24 February 1999. Interview of Kitsikis to Ferda Balancar].

³⁵² Kitsikis (2006), p. 67. To support his argument, Kitsikis invokes the 2004 European Commission Regular Report on Turkey, which estimates the Turkish Alevi in 12-20 million [Commission of the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession, SEC(2004) 1201, 6.10.2004: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf, p. 44 note 14; cited in Kitsikis (2006), pp. 84-85]. The report notes that "Alevi are not officially recognised as a religious community, they often experience difficulties in opening places of worship and compulsory religious instruction in schools fails to acknowledge non-Sunni identities" [See Report, p. 44]. Kitsikis further contends that it is thanks to Bektashism-Alevism that the European Union might accept some day the Turkish accession [Kitsikis (2006), p. 9; See also 'Türkiye Alevilik sayesinde Avrupa'ya girebilir', *Cumhuriyet*, 7 Mart 1999. Interview of Kitsikis to Miyase Ilknur].

intensification of the phenomenon of crypto-Christianity.³⁵³ This repression of Alevism persisted well into the 20th century in the Republic of Turkey, with a brief hiatus during the presidential tenure of Turgut Özal.³⁵⁴

For Kitsikis, the survival of Alevism in Turkey and the Balkans gives Orthodox Christians hope for the future, provided that the Greeks would put an end to their own spiritual decline and restore their faith.³⁵⁵ According to him, the supreme leader of his envisioned Turkish-Greek confederation could achieve unanimity between the Turks and the Greeks only if his is Alevi or Orthodox Christian (and not Muslim).³⁵⁶ However, the alarming rise of Islamism over the past few years in Turkey, and the tremendous threat that this religious fanaticism poses for the future of the country, does not leave Kitsikis enough room for optimism at this juncture.³⁵⁷ As he forewarns, “without the Alevis Turkey will depart from Greece and will slip into the arms of Arab Islamism”.³⁵⁸

Given the plenteous intellectual production and manifold personality of Kitsikis, it is difficult to put together a detailed and structured body of his beliefs. If we distill the most crucial precepts of today’s hellenoturkism from his writings, we come across a Turkish-Greek political ensemble of clearly identifiable ontological features. Modern hellenoturkism is endorsing the establishment of a confederative Turkish-Greek state consisting of two sovereign constituent entities (i.e. Turkey and Greece), with two respective national capitals

³⁵³ Kitsikis (2006), pp. 34, 101.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p. 11. According to Kitsikis, Özal’s presidency was the only “period of relative freedom and restitution of Alevis (...) after the assassination of the pro-Alevi Turkish President Özal from “heart attack” in 1993, the Alevis and the Kurds lost their protector” [*Ibid*, p. 75].

³⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 35. Indeed, as rigid as the post-1923 Kemalist secularism and the post-2003 Islamization may have been in Turkey, they could not eradicate the widespread Sufi movemnet that is deeply ingrained in Turkish society and cultural heritage. For the Alevism-Bektashism in Albania, *see* Kitsikis (2006), pp. 78-80. For a study on the Bektashism in Western Thrace, *see* Zengkinis (1989).

³⁵⁶ Kitsikis (2006), p. 9. Kitsikis contends that “with the Alevis, the Greek-Turkish state will be religious but tolerant and the common to the Greeks and the Turks values of Hellenism will prevail” [*Ibid*].

³⁵⁷ Kitsikis (2003), p. 270.

³⁵⁸ Kitsikis (2006), p. 9.

(Ankara and Athens) and a federal capital (a role which is by default ascribed to Istanbul).³⁵⁹ This confederated structure is purported to encompass two brotherly but distinct nations, which belong to the same civilizational region. That is, the hellenoturkic goal setting is now different than that of the 15th century (when nations had not yet been constructed), and that of the 19th century (when the ecumenical empire was still at place), but akin to those of the post-1922 hellenoturkic manifestations.³⁶⁰ Although Kitsikis approbates the Canadian model as a paragon for the Turkish-Greek confederation (possibly due to his personal experience as a Canadian citizen and resident), the specific political formula should still be further searched for. Indeed, the unprecedentedness of such a project leaves this question open to further debates.

In any event, the present condition of Greece and the current internal situation of Turkey have been adequately addressed. As regards the former, present-day hellenoturkists deem necessary the detachment of the Greece from the European Union, the reclaiming of its national sovereignty and ethnic identity, and the pursuance of a autonomous, multi-directional foreign strategy by a Panhellenic laocratic regime. As for Turkey, an equivalently strong national leadership is required, certainly non-Islamic and preferably of Alevi creed. Moreover, the clarification of the political landscape within Turkey's borders, and especially the effective resolution of the Kurdish issue (either through the creation of an independent Kurdistan, or with the federalization of the Turkish Republic), is of paramount importance.³⁶¹

³⁵⁹ “Çamlıca Hayali”, *Hürriyet*, 2 September 1978 ; “Türk-Yunan Federasyonu (?)”, *Tercüman*, 20 November 1981; ‘Türk-Yunan Dostluğuyla Ege sentezi’, 29 July 1988.

³⁶⁰ See Kitsikis (1998), p. 63.

³⁶¹ Kitsikis has clearly contended that the Kurds should be allowed to form their own state, invoking the 1920 Sevres Treaty and particularly articles 62 and 64 (which provided for the establishment of an independent Kurdistan) [e.g. see ‘Kürtler Sevr’in vaat ettiği devleti kurmalıdır’, *Özgür Gündem*, 23 September 1992. This was the last of three full-page articles that the Turkish newspaper published over 21-23 September 1992, with interviews of Kitsikis to Sedat Pişirici. All articles had as subtitle Kitsikis’s general proposal for the wider area: ‘Bati’da Ege Konfederasyon, Doğu’da bağımsız Kürdistan’. Notably, Kitsikis regards the Kurds as culturally distinct from the Turks and the Greeks, as well as politically hazardous for both nations. For the Kurdish issue and the danger it poses to Turkey, see Kitsikis (1998), pp. 293-301.

Finally, there should be some (re)arrangements between the two sides in the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus. Especially the latter could serve as a prequel of the union between Turkey and Greece, with the creation of a confederated Cyprus comprising a sovereign Greek-Cypriot and a respective Turkish-Cypriot state.³⁶² In the light of historical experience, the platform upon which the Cypriot reunification is currently discussed prescribes an *ab initio* stillborn federation. If Cyprus is to be reunified in a viable way, the solution that should be adopted at the first stage is that of a confederacy. Practice has shown that after this initial stage, every confederation tends to evolve into a supranational federation (e.g. Canada and Switzerland), whereas the political entities that are *a priori* built as federations (as it has been the case with certain conservation enterprises, or with federalist structures that were imposed by external or superior forces against the will of the involved peoples - e.g. the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) are likely to dissolve -sooner or later, peacefully or violently- in their constituent units.

As Kitsikis has often explained, the primordial scope of the Greek-Turkish confederation is to fill the political, cultural and economic vacuum that was created in the Eastern Mediterranean by the absence of the Byzantine/Ottoman imperial structures. At the same time, it is designed to efface all bilateral issues between Turkey and Greece, which freed of that burden could thereupon pursue an intensive and extensive participation in global affairs.³⁶³ Apart from this emancipating and empowering function, it would enable them to maintain their national distinctiveness, attain real sovereignty and resist pressures in the brave new world.³⁶⁴ Finally,

³⁶² Kitsikis (2013), pers. comm, 20 July.

³⁶³ For example, see 'Prof. Dr. Kitsikis: iki ülke çıkarları için biraraya gelmeliyiz', *Hürriyet*, 20 December 1981; 'Orta Asya'ya birlikte gidelim', *Aktüel*, no. 40, 9-15 April 1992. Interview of Kitsikis to Defne Sarısoy.

³⁶⁴ Interestingly, Kitsikis had put forward the same argumentation also in the context of the Cold War, especially vis-à-vis the Soviet threat [e.g. see 'Yunanlı bilim adamı "iki ülkenin çıkarı burada" diyor', *Hürriyet*, 1 September 1978; 'Yunanlı tarihçi Kitsikis: "Rusya bütün dünyayı tehdit eden bir emperyalisttir; Bizlerin yeri Üçüncü Dünya'dır" diyen», *Aydınlık*, 1 September 1978; 'Türkiye, Yunanistan'la konfederasyon kurmalı', *Milliyet*, 1 September 1978; 'To μέλλον του NATO' [The future of NATO], *Akropoli*, 7 December 1982 [Reporting on the 1982 NATO summit, where Kitsikis supported that NATO should help Greece and Turkey to form a confederation in view of the imminent collapse of the USSR].

it can could later become the yeast of a broader confederative multinational complex, with Cyprus, Albania,³⁶⁵ Kurdistan³⁶⁶ and Israel³⁶⁷ (if the being of the latter is ever seriously endangered) being the main candidates to participate in such enlargement.³⁶⁸

3. Epilogue

As regards the first conceptual component of “hellenoturkism” (namely the civilizational phenomenon, which forms the basis of the hellenoturkic ideology), a thorough assessment belongs to the discipline of history and exceeds the purview and the limited space of this paper. Indeed, the scope and multitude of the Turkish-Greek cultural interrelation are so enormously widespread as to defy any effort to capture all its aspects in a single study. What can be said here is that, under the rubric of “hellenoturkism”, Kitsikis attempted to rewrite the Turkish-Greek history of the past ten centuries in a uniquely innovative way, which falls short of the mainstream western and national historiographies before and after him. His most important contribution lies in the unveiling of historical facts that the domestic and foreign scientific propagandas have masterfully obfuscated in the last two centuries (imposing hence a distorted truth about the Turks and the Greeks) and the interpretation of others in a totally original manner. His deconstructive hypothesis concerning the relationship between the Greeks and the Turks in the Ottoman and post-Ottoman period has no use for the traditional

³⁶⁵ Kitsikis opines that the cultural affinity of the Albanians with the Greeks and the Turks can potentially bring them in this common polity: “The efforts for the creation of Greek-Albanian state since the time of Ali Pasha Tepelenli, and the parallel historical attempts for the establishment of a Turkish-Greek entity are both grounded on the cultural affinity of the Greeks with both the Albanians and the Turks, and might result some day in the constitution of a triple Turkish-Greek-Albanian confederation” [Kitsikis (2003), pp. 36-37, footnote]. See also Kitsikis (2006), pp. 78-80].

³⁶⁶ Provided that it would become independent.

³⁶⁷ The Israeli variable has urgently entered into the equation in the last years, in the light of the dramatically deteriorating situation in the Middle East, the alarming strengthening of traditionally anti-Jewish regional factors, and the parallel decline of the American power. In a future likely generalized attack on Israel, a broader confederative structure in the area can serve as a Noah’s Ark for the Jewish people, as it was the case with the Ottoman Empire after the expulsion of Sephardic Jews from Spain in 1492 [Kitsikis (2013), pers. comm, 22 August].

³⁶⁸ For the proposition of Kitsikis for the future geopolitical arrangement of the Middle East and the Intermediate Region *in toto*, see Appendix IV.

views on the topic and debunks national dogmas, popular myths and collective sentiments. In doing so, Kitsikis constructed a *sui generis* historiographical paradigm, untangling with scholarly craftsmanship the intricate pre-nationalistic and modern realities of the Turkish-Greek space.³⁶⁹

The main purpose of this paper was to examine the historical development of the hellenoturkic ideology, by looking at pertinent thematic discourses mirrored in private correspondence, official exchanges, public statements and parliament speeches, newspaper interviews, and the writings of eminent theorists. Despite the post-structuralist danger that always pervades the apprehension of such sources, the study unfurled a long chain of influential people from different historical and social strata championing the creation of a Turkish-Greek state: From the late Byzantine philosopher George of Trebizond (15th century); to the Greek politician Typaldos-Iakovatos, the Ottoman Greek entrepreneur Skalieris, the Ottoman Sultan Murad V, the Ottoman Greek financier Zarifis, the Ottoman senior statesman Karatheodori Pasha and the Greek intellectuals Dragoumis and Souliotis-Nicolaidis (mid-19th century until 1920); to the two key political figures in the modern history of Turkey and Greece, Atatürk and Venizelos (1928-1933); to the leaderships of the military regimes in both countries during the late 1960s and early 1970s (1968-1973); and, last but not least, to the totem of present-day hellenoturkism, Dimitri Kitsikis, who monopolises the ideology at the discursive level from the 1960s onwards. The timing and the

³⁶⁹ Expectedly, his revisionist historiographical approach has raised -and still does to date- fierce polemics on scientific grounds (that is, the substance of his arguments), as well as toward the political expediency that underlies it. The main criticism goes that Kitsikis twisted - arbitrarily and consciously- historical events in order to support his claim for the creation of a Turkish-Greek confederation [e.g. see ‘Τουρκική επιστημονική επίθεση στη Γαλλία και Έλληνες προπαγανδιστές’ [Turkish scientific attack in France and Greek propagandists], *Anti*, no. 325, 29 August 1986; ‘Έλληνοχριστιανικό μπουμπούκι με φέσι’ [A Greek-Orthodox “bud” with fez’], *Kalami*, 3 October 1986; ‘Περὶ Ὀθωμανικῆς Αὐτοκρατορίας’ [On (Kitsikis’s book) “Ottoman Empire”], *Kathimerini*, 18 December 1988]; “Ἡ Χιλιετής Ἱστορική ἀνάμιξη’ [The millenian historical intermingling], *Proti*, 28 January 1989; Kypris, P. K., “Τουρκία, Βαλκάνια, Παντουρκισμός και ο “Έλληνοτουρκισμός” του Δ.Ν. Κιτσίκη” [Turkey, the Balkans, Panturkism and the “Hellenoturkism” of D.N. Kitsikis], *Ellopia*, Athens, no. 4, Winter 1990, pp. 58-64; Chatziantoniou, C., “Τὸ μετέωρο βῆμα τῆς τουρκολαγνείας: Μία ἀπάντηση στὴ θεωρία τοῦ ἔλληνοτουρκισμοῦ” [The suspended step of “Turkolust”: A response to the theory of Hellenoturkism], *Tote*, no. 48, May-June 1994.

identity of the persons involved in the formulation of the plans for the constitution of a Turkish-Greek polity are crucial in savvying the motives behind hellenoturkism in its various appearances. Altogether, the findings of this study testify the resilience of the hellenoturkic ideology, despite the periodic ruptures and the longstanding emulation between two peoples.

In spite of all these hellenoturkic exercises throughout history, the Turkish-Greek state remained a chimera. Inevitably, one wonders about the current status and the future prospects of hellenoturkism. Kitsikis himself has pointed out that “for an ideology to exist there should be an audience that supports it, otherwise it would remain at the level of ideas”.³⁷⁰ The contemporary dynamics of hellenoturkism is a conundrum. Covertly and to an unidentified extent, it still influences members of the Greek and Turkish political, intellectual and business elites, as several rhetorics and deeds sporadically indicate.³⁷¹ However, as these forces that do not appear visibly enough on the surface, it is hard to document them clearly. What is sure is that, whatever the clout of hellenoturkism is, it runs the Greek and Turkish societies horizontally rather than vertically: On the popular lever, the hellenoturkic ideology is largely uncommunicated and thus unknown to the broad masses in both countries.

So, shall we rush to proclaim hellenoturkism an abortive ideology? Should there be a Turkish-Greek state, or shall we *ex ante* and without further ado disdain this idea as a condemned utopia or an ethnically suspicious scheme? Furthermore, does such a plan comply practically with the realities and exigencies of today and tomorrow, or is it plainly outmoded and farfetched?

Before we hurriedly hold hellenoturkism in contempt, we must reflect on some fundamental theoretical and pragmatic questions. These issues that show that hellenoturkism is critically

³⁷⁰ Kitsikis (2003), p. 53; Kitsikis (1971), p. 357.

³⁷¹ See for example, ‘Τα σχέδια του Ελληνοτουρκισμού’ [The plans of hellenoturkism], *Typos tis Kyriakis*, 13-14 April 1996, pp. 18-19; ‘Τα σχέδια του Ελληνοτουρκισμού’ [The plans of hellenoturkism], *Typos tis Kyriakis*, 21 April 1996, p. 32.

and painfully current, and that the Turkish-Greek partnership seems now not only as a hypothetically lucrative notion, but more as an essential course of action for the continuation of the very own existence of the Turkish and Greek nations. First and foremost, the Turks and the Greeks must finally provide a conclusive answer to the existential question that is posed to them -recurrently and relentlessly- throughout the last two hundred years, and relates to their position in the world. Frequently, this question is misleadingly formulated as a falsified “East versus West” dilemma. For reasons of obvious political expediency, this old western sophism was re-introduced more extortively than ever after 1990, as a manichaistic dichotomy between a “good” West and a “bad” East. Unfortunately, the establishments and the populace in Turkey and Greece tend to ingest thoughtlessly this spurious binarism, dashing to locate themselves and their countries to the West and forgetting that there is a third more fitting option.³⁷² Indeed, if Turkey and Greece are to survive and thrive, they shall not be either side’s outpost against the other, but they should instead form a distinct buffer zone bridging the West and the East. That is, they should reclaim their historical role, before the West descended the cultural iron curtain in the 19th century. Of course, such an endeavour requires beforehand a heuristic process in order to rediscover and reposition themselves, and it appears that Turkey is doing better than Greece in that respect at the top level since recently.

³⁷² Kitsikis notes on this topic: “The entire psychology of the Greek people in the 19th and 20th centuries depends on that attitude of the West, which is accustomed for centuries to usurp the Greek civilization and to call Greece “mother of the West” and, on the other hand, because it was finding out that the modern-day Greeks were not incorporated in the battered scheme of Hellenism, he tended not to accept that these Greeks was possibly descendants of the ancient Greeks. The Greeks feel rather distantly related to Europe, from which they exclude themselves. Despite the asseccion of Greece to the European Union in 1981, we see even today Greeks to say when they travel to Rome or Paris that they “are going to Europe”. Because although the Greek wallet is European, the Romaeic identity is outside Europe (...) Therefore, the problem of the Greek identity is essential: either he admits the claims of Europe, that the Greek antiquity *is* the West and therefore modern Greece belongs also to the West (so in order to costantly verify this claim the Greek struggling in any possible way to gain a face of the Westerner), or –since he realizes during the 19th and 20th centuries that he is not a European, he concludes that neither his ancestors were Europeans and that the Hellas of Pericles was not the West since Kolokotronis’s Greece was also not West. From here start the discussions between the Greek intellectuals to clarify whether their country belongs to the West or to the East. A similar phenomenon was observed -especially after the WWI- in Turkey, with Ataturk’s fury to reject everything Arabic, in his effort to align his country with the West in order to get rid of the Eastern miasmata” [Kitsikis (1998), pp. 36-37].

If the two nations are to reachieve this dialectic function, they should do it in tandem. This is not an easy task. The creation of the Greek and Turkish nation-states initially fended off and subsequently secluded completely the Greeks and the Turks, to such a degree that as their millennial symbiosis slid into mutual oblivion. The bitter bilateral experiences of the last two centuries –fueled by the poison that the West methodically instilled into the two peoples-overshadowed and expunged from the national memory 800 years of creative interaction, togetherness and joint cultural production, which allowed the two nations to assume together a protagonistic role in the western half of the Intermediate Region as the main carriers of its civilization. At the same time, both peoples individually neglected the fact that they are the main parceners of the Byzantine and Ottoman imperial heritage, with large chunks of the the respective societies conciously disavowing this invaluable legacy. Even now, though, almost one century after the collapse of the ecumenical empire, the implications of this momentous event for the two nations (as well as for the rest of its former constituent units) are both multifold and far-reaching.

Notwithstanding its profound repercussions, the formation of the two nation-states should be deemed as inevasible historical development, needed for the consolidation of the two peoples.³⁷³ Furthermore, it provides the basis for an egalitarian partnership among them, which should be primarily grounded on the strong cement that their common civilization entails. Having this unifying parameter always in mind, the two nations should then reflect on their present condition and the challenges that lie ahead of them. From both a semantic and a pragmatic point of view, there is no better occasion for such an undertaking: The upcoming 200th and 100th anniversaries from the start of the Greek War of Independence and the establishment of the Turkish Republic offer a first-rate opportunity for introspection, self-

³⁷³ Accordingly, Kitsikis has upheld that “fully conscious nations are needed for a united earth” [Kitsikis (1971), p. 347].

criticism and contemplation, whilst the existing socio-political and economic predicaments in both countries ask for reconsideration and novel planning.

Reflecting over Greece's performance over the last 196 years, as well as on its present state, one cannot allow oneself much jubilation. The current financial woes are only the tip of the iceberg, as the country has sunk into a sweeping crisis - national, political, social, religious and economic. This was the “tour de force” of the Western Party that prevails in Greece steadily since the inception of the Greek state, considering the accession of Greece to the European Union in 1981 as its magnum opus. Especially this latter choice brought disillusionment and plight to the country and emasculated Greekdom even further. It pulverized Greece’s economy and ate away at the fabric of its society, divesting it of its identity and values. The feigned economic bliss disguised a slow and well-planned process of ethnocid until the outburst of the financial crisis.³⁷⁴ Ironically, prior to their economic catastrophe the Greeks looked down vehemently on the Balkans and the Middle East (the historical strongholds of Hellenism and their ancestral homes) and the people that populate them, asserting their “superiority” as part of Europe and the EU. Even today that they have been degraded to such a point of general disrepute that the word “Greek” has taken on a pejorative meaning, even today that the manhandling of their country by its European “allies” and “partners” has brought them on the verge of an irremedial national disaster, the only plan of their ruling elites is the drowning in the European quagmire, not seeing any other future than being Europe’s debt colony. Makrygiannis’s maxim “we freed ourselves from the Turks and became enslaved to ill-fated people, who were the excreta of Europe” is now

³⁷⁴ As “ethnocid” we define the cultural assassination of a nation by means of assimilation by another nation or entity. The term was used by Robert Jaulin in his noteworthy book, *La Paix Blanche. Introduction à l’ethnocide* [Paris, Seuil, 1970] and is cited in Kitsikis (1971), p. 353.

triumphantly vindicated.³⁷⁵ If Greece does not abandon its cyclopic, unidimensional approach, its already infinitesimal leverage will be further debilitated and ultimately vanish.

Similar maladies plague Turkey, which is at precarious crossroads. The contemporary Turkish reality, especially with reference to unfolding social changes and the composition of its population, is puzzling. The country seems caught in a self-created tragic circle, being unable to address the festering problems that have tormented it for decades (mainly the Kurdish) and find peace with itself. The coming years carry developments, the proportions of which we cannot begin to imagine at this juncture. At the same time, Turkey still retains some imperial reflexes as the main successor of the Ottoman Empire, a fact that assigns to her the chief responsibility of taking action towards the reorganization of the broader space surrounding it. This responsibility should be exercised prudently and boldly, through political, non-forceful means. In keeping with the avowed Kissingerian dictum “foreign policy is the art of establishing priorities”, Turkey should promptly redefine its direction. The recent impasses of the Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Egypt and Syria manifest the absurdity of the Turkish pretension to a regional domination in the Middle East –*Timeo* the Saudis, Qataris and Iranians!- and point towards a more apt direction, that of Greece and the Balkans.

After self-questioning ourselves, we should tune to the realities and respond to the exigencies of the modern world, by making some basic pragmatic calculations. The contemporary international and regional developments constitute an independent variable and a determinant that affects significantly the prospects of hellenoturkism. At the international level, we observe the withering of the state-centrism both in theory and in practice. Although we have not yet experienced the end of nation-state as the core actor of the international system, this day seems not so far away. The obsolescence of the public international law principles of

³⁷⁵ General Yannis Makriyannis (1797–1864), Greek military officer during the Greek War of Independence (1821-1930).

“inviolability of borders” and “non-interference in domestic affairs” is a long drawn-out policy that has been happening before our eyes for years. Furthermore, the post-WWII imperatives that impelled nations to break out of the narrow historically-imposed structures and integrate into organisms controlled by supra-national authorities have been now gravely intensified.

At the moment, Globalism and Multipolarism are the two geopolitical cosmovisions that are jostling against each other for the shaping of the future international system. This ongoing bras de fer prescribes two possibilities: either the definite prevalence of globalization (which will cause the liquidation of the nations into a global melting pot) or the emergence of a more balanced -and thus desirable- multipolar world. If the second scenario reifies (as the ensuing decline of the American influence, the multiplication in the number of big and middle powers and the overall shifting constellation of global power indicate), the role of great ensembles would become at once pivotal. In such an eventuality, Greece and Turkey should act accordingly in order to claim jointly a central position and a consequential role in the new global order.

At the regional level, the stakes are also high. The recent economic downturn has put strains on the European partnership -the only standing great ensemble - and one can only speculate if the EU will survive in the future (at least in its current form). The economic crisis has revealed that the EU is not as cohesive as previously thought, and far from being a partnership of equals. Rather, it is more an asymmetric entity of homocentric circles that reflect hierarchies of nations within it, increasingly dominated by Germany. Furthermore, the very nature of the EU (which is congenitally a community of mostly economic interests where nations accept their association not through sentiment but through self-interest) contains in it the centrifugal contingency. The day these centripetal factors disappear, the EU will either break down into

its constituent parts, or it will be limited to its nucleus with the weaker and culturally disparate elements of which it is composed (like Greece) being attracted from the outside towards the entities with which they form a community of culture or religion.³⁷⁶ The patent inability of the European leaderships to heal its intrinsic structural deficiencies and dysfunctionalities strengthens such a possibility. However, even if the ill-designed EU stays, a potential Turkish accession will lead to a *de facto* indirect realization of the hellenoturkic targeting: By entering the EU, Turkey will join other member states such as Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Cyprus and a modified version of Dragoumis's Eastern Federation might yet come to exist.³⁷⁷

As regards the Middle East, the situation is more disheartening than ever. This ceaselessly turbulent region is currently dragged into a horrendous anarchy and chaos, with the involvement of international, regional and local actors into a frenetic tug of war. What is usually overlooked is the root cause of any unrest in that area, i.e. the extinction of the imperial structures that were keeping it relatively stable. Already since 1942, Pierre Waltz had concluded in his book *La question d'Orient dans L'Antiquité* that "the existence of a united Aegiiis (...) seems to be a *conditio sine qua non* for any solution, as stable as possible, of the Eastern question (...) If a big empire was reestablished in the two shores of the Archipelago, it would be possible to have a new era of peace and tranquility in Southeast Europe and the Middle East".³⁷⁸ That is, the formation of a Turkish-Greek confederation (and its later expansion with the inclusion of other states) could be a stabilizing device for this sensitive region, safeguarding at the same time the national interests of its parties.³⁷⁹

How the aforesaid challenges will be addressed is the question at hand. Each nation must

³⁷⁶ See also Kitsikis (1971), p. 356.

³⁷⁷ See also Mazis (2014), p. 271.

³⁷⁸ Waltz (1942), pp. 362-363. Cited in Kitsikis (2003), p. 210.

³⁷⁹ For a similar proposal, see Lambinet (2013).

prepare a timely and adequate response to them if it wants to survive and prosper. Fortunately, the contemporary regional and global developments are reminiscent of a number of historical events that have shaped our world, and hence they offer us the necessary prescience. The history of the last two centuries provides a useful barometer and analytical tool for the assessment of the international system's future orientation, reminding us of the need to study and extrapolate from it before we devise our strategies. In our case as Turks and Greeks, this means that we have the duty to revisit our -alas, unimpeccable!- past and disentangle it from barren connotations, in order to plan our future steps and eschew repeating costly errors. In that respect, the example of hellenoturkists serves as a luminous beacon enlightening our path.

As this paper clearly displayed, the idea of the Turkish-Greek political unification comes dynamically to the forefront once every fifty years in the route of our modern history. Although the likelihood of the formation of a Turkish-Greek state is currently weak, this scenario may soon arise as a credible hypothesis, sensible recourse or historically dictated necessity. The contemporary international and regional environment facilitates the building up of a propitious new momentum. A Turkish-Greek confederation, within which the Greeks and the Turks will rank *pari passu*, will then emerge as an optimal response of both nations to their external and domestic trials. From George of Trebizond to Dimitri Kitsikis, a long sequence of people sowed a rich seed. Today that the requisite direction of Hellenism and Turkism toward the restitution of the Greek-Turkish ensemble is confirmed, a new generation of hellenoturkists in both countries should take up the cause and give to it a propulsive mobilizing force. The road to Çamlıca is a historical inevitability, a one-way that Turkey and Greece will daringly march together in order to meet the shared destiny.³⁸⁰ The persistent

³⁸⁰ Consistent to his Marxist beliefs, Kitsikis had accordingly declared: "I believe in historical determinism. The politicians in both countries express that determinism with the often-repeated observation that the two peoples are condemned by history to cooperate with each other" [Kitsikis (1998), p. 23].

question of Kitsikis echoes more topically than ever: Who among the Turks and the Greeks will overcome its inertia and, as the heir of the bimillennian empire, will reunite the Turkish-Greek space for the sake of both peoples?

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
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

The Intermediate Region



Sources: 'Intermediate Region', Wikipedia.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intermediate_Region#/media/File:Intermediate_Region_FR.jpg;
Kitsikis, D. (1998), *Συγκριτική Ιστορία Ελλάδος και Τουρκίας στον 20ό αιώνα* [Comparative History of Greece and Turkey in the 20th century], 3rd edition, Hestia, Athens, pp. 38-39.

APPENDIX II

The western frontier of the Intermediate Region



Source: 'Intermediate Region', Wikipedia.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intermediate_Region#/media/File:Intermediate_Region_Western_Boundary_FR.JPG

NOTE: In the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, Kitsikis redrew the western border of the Intermediate Region vis-à-vis Ukraine. As he indicated in his classes and writings, as well as to the author himself, this border should cut Ukraine in two portions, with the western half being ascribed to the West and the eastern part to the Intermediate Region. Kitsikis emphasized that Ukraine presents the same characteristics with former Yugoslavia (with Croatia and Slovenia belonging to the West, while Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo being positioned in the Intermediate Region), and former Pakistan (with Bangladesh belonging to the East and present day Pakistan being split by the Indus River between the Intermediate Region and the East). Kitsikis has always contended that any country whose territory overlaps two civilizational regions cannot survive united for long and will be inevitably partitioned.

APPENDIX III


Table with the key features of the two main parties in the modern history of Greece and Turkey

WESTERN PARTY		EASTERN PARTY	
		Modernists	Traditional
Social origin	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Upper/middle bourgeoisie - Intelligentsia - Working class/proletariat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Petty bourgeoisie - Smallholder farmers/peasantry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Big landowners - Upper/middle bourgeoisie, victim of Western politico-economic-cultural penetration - Farmers
Ideological position	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bourgeois cosmopolitanism and labor internationalism - French-type nationalism - Renaissance rationalism - Does not recognise the existence of the Intermediate Region 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Balkan-Asian Hellenism of the type of Rigas Feraios - Ottomanism - German-type nationalism - Neutralism - Egalitarian Hellenoturkism - Rousseauism - Deep attachment to the popular psyche 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Byzantine/Ottoman ecumenism - Imperial Hellenoturkism - Pan-Islamism - Attachment to the concept of the Intermediate Region
Political and economic regime	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Constitutional monarchy or parliamentary republic, and economic liberalism <li style="text-align: center;"><i>or</i> - Dictatorship of the proletariat and collectivism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Authoritarian regime, essentially anti-royalist [monarchy is either totally abolished or the monarch retains a symbolic role] with statism and solidarism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Absolute monarchy and mercantilism

Source: Kitsikis, D. (1998), *Συγκριτική Ιστορία Ελλάδος και Τουρκίας στον 20ό αιώνα* [Comparative History of Greece and Turkey in the 20th century], 3rd edition, Hestia, Athens, p. 31.

APPENDIX IV

Kitsikis's proposal for the future geopolitical order of the Middle East



Source: Kitsikis, D., 'Les frontières de sang: Géopolitique d'un Proche-Orient à venir', *Diplomatie*, no. 24, pp. 48-51 (January-February 2007), at p. 51.